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Notes
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND ALLIED BANK
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, United States banks have loaned billions of
dollars to developing countries considered creditworthy based on their
historic growth rates and vast untapped natural resources.' In 1980-
198 1, however, many of these borrower countries became unable to ser-
vice their external debt as a result of the coincidence of the worldwide
recession, depressed export markets, disinflation, and lower oil prices.2
The enormity of United States banks' involvement in international
loan transactions accounted for the grave concern that arose in the
1. See Eskridge, Les Jeux Sont Faits: Structural Origins of the International Debt
Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 293-94 (1985). Professor Eskridge explains that
the largest total bank loans were made to Latin American countries. Id. at 282.
As of 1983, the leading borrowers in Latin America were Brazil, Mexico, Argen-
tina, and Venezuela; exposure of eight leading United States banks in loans to
these countries, as of December 31, 1983, is shown below:
Millions of Dollars in Loans
Bank Argentina Brazil Mexico Venezuela Loans as % of Bank's
Capital
Citicorp 1090 4700 2900 1500 154.3
Bank America 300 2484 2741 1614 116.7
Mf'rs Hanover 1321 2130 1915 1084 200.3
Chase Manhattan 775 2560 1553 1226 136.5
J.P. Morgan 741 1785 1174 464 102.9
Chemical 370 1276 1414 776 136.0
Bankers Trust 230 743 1286 436 119.4
Continental Ill. 401 476 699 436 83.9
Id. at 293 n.23 (citing Latin American Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at 8). See also Com-
ment, On Third World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 88-89 (1984). The unprece-
dented lending to lesser developed countries was made possible by a surge of
dollar deposits in United States banks by the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) followirlg OPEC's four-fold oil price increases in 1973.
Id. at 88. The banks, in turn, oaned money to developing countries, some of
which needed money to pay "spectacular" oil bills and all of which needed
money to stimulate their domestic economies. Id. at 90. See also Mendez, Recent
Trends in Commercial Bank Lending to LDCs: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution,
8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 173, 176-81 (1982). Prior to 1973, developing
countries obtained needed capital from public sources; credit extended by multi-
lateral financing agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank),
government loans, and the sale of government bonds were the main credit
sources. Id. at 176. However, since 1973, with the dramatic increase in loans
from commercial banks, about two-thirds of the debt of the developing world is
owed to private creditors. A Nightmare of Debt: A Survey of International Banking,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982, at 99.
2. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 282-84.
(291)
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banking community when, in 1981, the Costa Rican government issued
directives temporarily prohibiting Costa Rican banks from repaying ex-
ternal debts in foreign currency. 3 As a result of the Costa Rican direc-
tives, two banking syndicates 4 that had loaned money to Costa Rican
banks brought suit in the United States to enforce the terms of the loan
agreements.5
These cases turned on the issue of whether the act of state doctrine6
3. For a discussion of the Costa Rican directives, see infra note 122.
4. Banking syndicates, or associations of banks, were often formed to fi-
nance loans to foreign governments and their instrumentalities. See Clarke &
Farrar, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to Govern-
ment Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229; Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling
International Financial Transactions: A Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by Com-
mercial Banks, 18 INT'L LAw. 869 (1984). See also infra note 124.
5. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.
Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 30 (1985).
For a discussion of the Libra case, see infra note 126. For a discussion of the
Allied case, see infra notes 124-57 and accompanying text.
6. The act of state doctrine prohibits review of acts of a foreign sovereign
by United States courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
401 (1964). Although the doctrine is often confused with sovereign immunity,
the two doctrines are distinct. See Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by De-
fault: The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business
Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225, 230-31 (1985). Sovereign immunity focuses on
whether the foreign sovereign may be a party to the suit, not on the acts of a
foreign sovereign. See Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The Via-
bility of the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign Soverign Immunities Act, 18 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 547, 564 (1983). Historically, foreign sovereign states were granted abso-
lute immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts. Id. at 548-49. The
concept of absolute immunity, however, was superseded in the United States
courts by a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under which a court could
exercise jurisdiction over a sovereign state acting in a private or commercial ca-
pacity. Id. at 549-50.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
which codified the restrictive theory. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
1611 (1982)). The FSIA "provided a statutory means for obtaining service
upon, and in personam jurisdiction over, a foreign state; and attempted to pro-
vide thejudgment creditor a remedy should the foreign state fail to satisfy a final
judgment." Comment, supra, at 550-51 (footnote omitted). In part, the FSIA
declares that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction in any of the follow-
ing circumstances: (1) where the foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived
its immunity; (2) where the cause of action is based on a commercial activity
carried on by the foreign state; and (3) where property, present in the United
States by reason of the foreign state's commercial activities, was taken in viola-
tion of international law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), (2), (3) (1982).
Where a United States bank enters into a loan agreement with a foreign
sovereign state or one of its instrumentalities, the bank will typically require the
foreign borrower to waive immunity. See Comment, supra note 1, at 100-04. If
the borrower subsequently defaults, the borrower will not be able to raise sover-
eign immunity as a defense to jurisdiction. See id. at 105-07. If the default is
compelled by a governmental act restricting external debt repayments, a court,
notwithstanding its jurisdiction under the FSIA, may recognize the act of the
292 [Vol. 3 1: p. 291
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requires United States courts to recognize the validity of the Costa Rican
directives. 7 The act of state doctrine is a judicial doctrine whereby a
United States court, notwithstanding its jurisdiction over a case, will not
question the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign state done within
that state's territory.8 One of these cases, Allied Bank International v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,9 reached the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which initially did not address the applicability of the act
of state doctrine, 10 and then, on rehearing, vacated its earlier decision
and found the doctrine inapplicable. 1"
The Allied case brings to the forefront the problems which result in
applying traditional act of state analyses to acts by debtor countries af-
fecting intangible property such as a bank debt. This note will examine
the act of state doctrine and the rationales set forth by the Supreme
Court that justify application of the doctrine. The note will also de-
scribe the application of the doctrine to intangible property by lower
defaulting sovereign borrower under the act of state doctrine. Cf. Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985). Calljo involved a suit brought
by United States citizens who held certificates of deposit issued by a Mexican
bank. Id. at 1105. In 1982, the Mexican government issued exchange controls
that compelled the Mexican bank to pay the certificate holders substantially less
than the face value of the certificates upon maturity. Id. at 1106. When the
holders sued, the Mexican banks asserted the defense of sovereign immunity.
Id. Although the Mexican banks were nationalized, the court did not find the
banks immune from jurisdiction under the FSIA. Id. at 1106-12. The certificate
holders thus met the jurisdictional requirements for bringing suit against the
Mexican banks; however, they did not prevail because the court held that the act
of state doctrine applied to the Mexican government's act of imposing exchange
controls. Id. at 1125. For a further discussion of the Callejo case, see infra notes
88-95 and accompanying text.
Further discussion of sovereign immunity and the FSIA is beyond the scope
of this note. For an analysis of the relationship of the act of state doctrine to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, see generally Comment, supra.
7. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870,
877-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,
566 F. Supp. 1440, 1443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
8. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). For
a recent, comprehensive overview of the act of state doctrine see Bazyler, Abolish-
ing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1985).
9. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
10. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Allied !), No. 83-
7714 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984) [reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 742, 746
(1984)], withdrawn and vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.) (Allied II), cert. dismissed, 106
S. Ct. 30 (1985). After the Second Circuit granted a rehearing (Allied II), the
Allied I decision, which initially appeared in the advance sheets of the Federal
Reporter, 733 F.2d 23, was withdrawn from the bound volume. Subsequent cita-
tions to Allied I will be to its reprinting in International Legal Materials. For a dis-
cussion of Allied I, see infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
11. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Allied I1),757
F.2d 516, 519-21 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985). For a discussion
of Allied H, see infra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
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courts, which have set forth several inconsistent tests for determining
whether the intangible property at issue falls within the doctrine. Fi-
nally, this note will criticize the Second Circuit's decision in the Allied
case, in which the issue of whether to apply the act of state doctrine
turned on a tenuous analysis of the "situs" of the Costa Rican bank debt.
In light of the fact that the act of state doctrine was developed with re-
spect to sovereign acts affecting tangible property within the foreign
sovereign's dominion, this note will suggest that in cases involving in-
tangible property, a court should not engage in the impossible task of
locating the intangible property, but rather should apply the doctrine
based on its policy justifications as set forth by the Supreme Court.' 2
12. In addition to the act of state doctrine, the International Monetary
Fund Articles of Agreement (Bretton Woods Agreement) arguably controls liti-
gation questioning a sovereign state's currency controls that affect international
loan transactions. See, e.g., Gold, Exchange Control: Act of State, Public Policy, the
IMF's Articles of Agreement, and Other Complications, 7 Hous. J. Ir'L L. 13 (1984).
While an extensive discussion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is be-
yond the scope of this note, a brief explanation of the IMF and its potential
application to international loan transactions follows.
In 1944, 44 countries, including the United States, established the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. J. PIPPENGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
138, 141 (1984). Member countries contribute money to the IMF for the pri-
mary purpose of aiding countries with balance of payment deficits, i.e., where
payments made for imports are below payments received for exports. See 2 P.
WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE § 4.14[1][a] (1986).
Where a member country is in payment difficulties, the IMF can, as a lender of
last resort and on a limited basis, provide currency to restore a country's credit.
See id. Additionally, "the Fund has the necessary diplomatic power to insist
upon the adoption of fiscal reforms and other austerity programmes as a condi-
tion of its assistance ... [thereby encouraging] private lenders to make up for
the limited resources of the Fund by restoring credit to the member [country]
concerned .... " Id. See also Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter
in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143 (1984).
Article VIII, § 2(b), of the Bretton Woods Agreement addresses the extra-
territorial effect of exchange control regulations that a member country main-
tains consistently with the Bretton Woods Agreement: "Exchange contracts
which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the ex-
change control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently
with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member."
International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VIII,
§ 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended by 20 U.S.T.
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266 (May 31, 1968), amended by 29 U.S.T.
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, - U.N.T.S. - (Apr. 30, 1978) (codified by reference at
22 U.S.C. § 286h (1982)). In essence, this section of the Agreement provides
that exchange control regulations including, perhaps, directives such as those
issued by Costa Rica, may invalidate "exchange contracts" extraterritorially. See
Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 6, at 247-48. The crucial question where a member
country invokes this provision to invalidate an international loan agreement is
whether the loan agreement may be characterized as an "exchange contract."
Id. at 248.
Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica illustrates how this provision of
the Bretton Woods Agreement is invoked. 570 F. Supp. 870, 896-902 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In Libra, a British banking syndicate sued a Costa Rican bank in the
United States when the Costa Rican Bank defaulted on a loan following the issu-
294 [Vol. 3 1: p. 291
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II. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In 1897, the act of state doctrine was first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez,13 a case in which a
United States citizen sued the revolutionary military governor of Vene-
zuela for unlawful confinement and assault.14 The Court found that the
military governor was acting on behalf of the de facto government of
Venezuela and held that his actions were unreviewable by a United
ance of the Costa Rican government's directives prohibiting external debt repay-
ment. Id. at 874-75. Both Costa Rica and the United States are signatories of
the IMF Agreement. Id. at 897. Moving for reargument of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, which had been granted by the court, the Costa Rican bank
defendant invoked article VIII, § 2(b), and contended that the Costa Rican di-
rectives were exchange control regulations that were imposed consistently with
the Bretton Woods Agreement. Id. at 897. The Costa Rican bank alleged that
the loan agreements were thus invalid under article VIII, § 2(b), as "exchange
contracts" contrary to the Costa Rican directives. Id. The Libra court construed
"exchange contract" narrowly to include only contracts "for the exchange of
one currency against another or one means of payment against another." Id.
(quoting 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 425 (1982)). Accord-
ingly, the Libra court found that the international loan agreement was not an
"exchange contract" under the Bretton Woods Agreement. 570 F. Supp. at
900. The Libra court further noted that even if the loan agreements were "ex-
change contracts," no authority supported the proposition that a currency regu-
lation, such as the Costa Rican directives, adopted after the formation of the
exchange contract (the loan agreements) could render the exchange contract
invalid. Id. Finally, the court noted that no evidence demonstrated that the
Costa Rican directives were consistent with the IMF Articles of Agreement. Id.
at 901. For a discussion of the Libra case with respect to its act of state analysis,
see infra note 126.
Considerable disagreement exists as to whether article VIII, § 2(b), of the
Bretton Woods Agreement includes international loan transactions within the
term "exchange contract". See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 6, at 248. United
States courts typically have adopted the narrow construction of exchange con-
tracts. Id. Several scholars and some European courts, however, have adopted a
broad construction that would include international loan agreements or any
other contracts affecting monetary elements. See id; Williams, Extraterritorial En-
forcenent of Exchange Control Regulations under the International Monetary Fund Agree-
ment, 15 VA. J. INr'L L. 319 (1975). Thus, article VIII, § 2(b), of the Bretton
Woods Agreement potentially could emerge as the controlling legal principle in
United States courts for determining the validity of international loan
transactions.
13. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
14. Id. at 251. In Underhill, the plaintiff, an American citizen, was living in
Venezuela where he had constructed a waterworks and carried on a machinery
repair business. Id. When the revolutionary government of Hernandez rose to
power, Underhill made several requests for a passport to leave Venezuela. Id.
The Hernandez government, which was recognized by the United States as the
legitimate government of Venezuela, repeatedly denied Underhill's request
before finally granting him a passport. Id. Subsequently, Underhill brought an
action against Hernandez in the Second Circuit for damages that arose as a re-
sult of his confinement in Venezuela. Id. The trial court held for the defendant
on the grounds that he was acting on behalf of the de facto government of Vene-
zuela. Id. at 251-52.
1986] NOTE 295
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States court. 15 The Court, in reaching this decision, stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the indepen-
dence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves. 16
The modern statement of the act of state doctrine was expressed in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,17 in which the Supreme Court held:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign gov-
ernment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of
the suit, in the absence of treaty or other unambiguous agree-
ment regarding controlling legal principles, even if the com-
plaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law. 18
15. Id. at 254.
16. Id. at 252.
17. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, an American commodity broker,
Farr, Whitlock & Co. (Farr, Whitlock), contracted to purchase sugar from Com-
pania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C.A.V.), a Cuban corporation
largely owned by United States residents. Id. at 401. Thereafter, C.A.V. was
nationalized by Fidel Castro's regime. Id. Following the nationalization, Farr,
Whitlock was required to enter into new contracts with an instrumentality of the
Cuban government in order to receive delivery of the sugar expropriated from
C.A.V. Id. at 403-05. The sugar was then delivered to Farr, Whitlock's cus-
tomer in Morocco. Id. at 405.
The Cuban instrumentality assigned its interest in the Farr, Whitlock con-
tract to Banco Nacional de Cuba (Banco Nacional). Id. When Banco Nacional
sought payment for the sugar through its agent in New York, Farr, Whitlock
refused to pay even though it had received payment from its customer. Id. at
405-06. Farr, Whitlock was acting at the request of C.A.V., which claimed it was
rightfully entitled to payment for the expropriated sugar and which agreed to
indemnify Farr, Whitlock for any loss. Id. at 405. Sabbatino was then appointed
temporary receiver of the proceeds paid to Farr, Whitlock for the sugar. Id. at
406.
Banco Nacional brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to recover those proceeds in an action for conver-
sion of the bills of lading. Id. The district court held that the Cuban expropria-
tion violated international law and was ineffective to pass title of the sugar from
C.A.V. to the Cuban instrumentality. Id. The district court found that the act of
state defense was not available to Banco Nacional since the Cuban act violated
international law. Id. at 406-07. The Second Circuit affirmed, relying on two
State Department letters indicating the Executive Branch's willingness to judi-
cially test the Cuban expropriation decrees. Id. at 407. For a discussion of the
lower court opinions in Sabbatino, see Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The
Second Circuit and Sabbatino, 8 VILL. L. REV. 155 (1962).
18. 376 U.S. at 428.
296 [Vol. 3 1: p. 291
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Although the Underhill and Sabbatino formulations of the act of state
doctrine may seem to suggest that a court should decline jurisdiction
and exercise judicial restraint in appropriate circumstances, the doctrine
actually functions as a special choice of law rule. 19 The traditional rule
for determining the appropriate law in a case involving an act of a for-
eign sovereign is to apply the law of the state where the act took place.20
An exception to this rule arises where that law violates the public policy
of the forum. 2 1 Where a foreign state acts within its own territory, the
act of state doctrine effectively precludes this public policy exception to
the traditional choice of law rule.2 2 In appropriate circumstances, the
doctrine will also override contractual agreements specifying the choice
of law.23 In Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 2 4 the Supreme Court explained
19. See Crockett, Choice of Law Aspects of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1041, 1053-54 (1983). The Underhill formula-
tion of the doctrine, including the statement that a court will not "sit in judg-
ment on the acts of a government of another," is misleading since it suggests
that a court shall decline jurisdiction. See id. at 1053 (citing Underhill, 168 U.S. at
252). See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 469 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]. This note provides:
In most cases, the act of state doctrine may be seen as a special rule of
conflict of laws. The normal rule of choice of law in most act of state
cases would point to application of the law of the state where the act
took place; that rule may be disregarded in certain instances where the
law thus chosen would violate the strong public policy of the forum,
e.g., a policy against expropriation without compensation.... The act
of state doctrine precludes giving effect to that public policy to deny
effect to the foreign law.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971)). See also
Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
175, 178 (1967) ("[a]ct of state is a special rule modifying the ordinary rules of
conflict of laws").
20. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, § 469 reporters note 1.
21. See id. See also A. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw OR CONFLICT OF LAws 33-44 (1981) (describing historical ba-
sis for public policy as a general limitation upon domestic recognition of foreign
law).
22. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, § 469 reporter's note 1.
23. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, § 469 comment e. Sover-
eign governments or private parties involved in an international agreement gen-
erally may specify in the agreement a choice of law to govern their rights and
liabilities. See 2 P. WOOD, supra note 12, §§ 1.01-.04 (1986). For example, in a
loan transaction, the parties may specify in the loan contracts that the law of the
lender's country will govern the contract so as to insulate the loan agreement
from "political interference by legal changes effected in the borrower's coun-
try." Id. § 1.03[4]. However, as is stated in the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law, the act of state doctrine may render any contractually specified choice of
law meaningless so that the act of state becomes the applicable law to govern the
transaction. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, § 469 comment e. This
comment to the Restatement provides that the act of state doctrine cannot be
"waived" by the foreign state, and that "indications of consent to adjudication
by the courts of another state are highly relevant, though not conclusive." Id.
24. 246 U.S. 304 (1918). In Ricaud, the plaintiff, a United States citizen,
7
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the effect of characterizing the act of state doctrine as a choice of law
rule. The Court observed that the act of state doctrine does not deprive
a court ofjurisdiction over a case.25 Rather, where the doctrine is appli-
cable, a court must exercise jurisdiction, construe the foreign sover-
eign's act as a valid exercise of its authority, and accept the act as the
rule of decision in the case.26
While there is general agreement that the act of state doctrine func-
tions as a "super choice-of-law" principle,2 7 the Supreme Court has not
been clear or consistent in explicating the doctrine's underlying ratio-
nales. Over the years, the Court has enunciated a variety ofjustifications
for the doctrine.2 8 In Underhill, the Court's opinion suggested that the
inherent nature of sovereign authority grants a foreign sovereign state
immunity from domestic judicial review of acts done within the sover-
eign's own territory. 29
purchased lead bullion from a Mexican mining company. Id. at 306. The lead
bullion was confiscated by a revolutionary Mexican general during the Mexican
Revolution. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the validity of the confiscation
could not be examined because it was a Mexican act of state within Mexican
borders. Id. at 310.
25. Id. at 309.
26. Id. The Court stated:
[The act of state doctrine] does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction
once acquired over a case. It requires only that, when it is made to
appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on the
subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of
the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a
rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to decide ac-
cordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an
exercise of it.
Id. See also Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected. The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised
Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68, 74-76 (1985);
Crockett, supra note 19, at 1053-54; Henkin, supra note 19, at 178.
27. See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of
Law (pt. 6), 87 COM. LJ. 129, 130 n.15 (1982) (in most recent Supreme Court
decision on act of state doctrine, seven Justices endorsed view that doctrine re-
quires court to use foreign law as rule of decision) (citing Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18, 726-28 (1976)).
28. See, e.g., Conant, The Act of State Doctrine and Its Exceptions: An Introduction,
12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1979) (describing and criticizing variety ofjusti-
fications posited by Supreme Court and lower courts invoking act of state doc-
trine). See also RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 19, § 469 comment a.
29. 168 U.S. at 252. In its brief opinion, the Underhill Court focused mainly
on the issue of whether Hernandez, as military chief of the revolutionary govern-
ment of Venezuela, was acting under the authority of the revolutionary govern-
ment of Venezuela, which was recognized by the United States as the
government of the country. Id. at 253-54. The Court agreed with the finding of
the lower court that "the evidence upon the trial indicated that the purpose of
the defendant in his treatment of the plaintiff was to coerce the plaintiff to oper-
ate his waterworks and his repair works for the benefit of the community and the
revolutionary forces." Id. at 254 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577,
579 (2d Cir. 1895)). The Court's emphasis on absolute sovereign immunity was
evidenced by its conclusion that "[t]he immunity of individuals from suits
brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in the exercise
8
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The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Un-
derhill revealed a second rationale for the doctrine, which the Supreme
Court expressly relied on in later decisions.30 The Second Circuit
stated that international comity justifies recognition of the validity of
foreign acts of state in appropriate circumstances.3 1 The principle of
international comity holds that a domestic court may give effect to a for-
eign act where such recognition would serve "international duty and
convenience" and would not undermine the rights of any citizens within
the forum.3 2 Accordingly, comity operates as an exception to one of the
of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders,
must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force
as a matter of fact." Id. at 252. See also Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the
Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 599, 604 (1980). This commen-
tator suggests that ChiefJustice Fuller's act of state formulation in Underhill was
an expression of his dissatisfaction with the outcome of two other Supreme
Court cases decided in that era which were not in accordance with the notion of
absolute sovereign immunity. Id. at 604-05. In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme
Court refused to enforce a French judgment entered against an American citi-
zen. 159 U.S. 113, 227-29 (1895). In The Paquete Habana, the Court invalidated
the seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels by the United States during the Span-
ish-American War. 175 U.S. 677, 678, 714 (1900). In each of these cases, Chief
Justice Fuller dissented, reflecting his broad conviction that "courts should ab-
stain from adjudicating disputes involving acts of foreign states." Note, supra, at
605.
30. Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aft'd, 168 U.S. 250
(1897).
31. Id. at 579. In Underhill, the Second Circuit held that military and civil
public agents of foreign governments are immune from suit in the United States.
Id. at 583. Although the court based its decision on the jurisdictional issue of
sovereign immunity, it relied on the theory of international comity as a justifica-
tion for its decision:
Considerations of comity, and of the highest expediency, require
that the conduct of states . . .should not be called in question by the
legal tribunals of another jurisdiction. The citizens of a state have an
adequate redress for any grievances at its hands by an appeal to ... the
other departments of their own government.... [Ilt would imperil the
amicable relations between governments, and vex the peace of nations,
to permit the sovereign acts or political transactions of states to be sub-
jected to the examination of the legal tribunals of other states.
Id. at 579. See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign
Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 469, 471-74 (1985) (describing policy justifications for act of state doc-
trine suggested by the Underhill opinions).
32. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
In Hilton, the Supreme Court made the following concise statement of the
principle of international comity:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which
the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by
executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be al-
lowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon
.the comity of nations."
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
1986] NOTE 299
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fundamental maxims of private international law-that no law of a sov-
ereign government is effective outside the sovereign's own territory.3 3
In American jurisprudence, comity is employed to modify this territorial
rule since its rigid application would be detrimental to amicable rela-
tions among nations.34
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 3 5 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle of international comity as a policy justification for the act of
state doctrine as was suggested by the Second Circuit's opinion in Un-
derhill.36 In Oetjen, the Court refused to question the validity of an ex-
propriation by the Mexican government during the Mexican Revolution
of 1913-1914. 37 The Court stated that the act of state doctrine rested
"upon the highest considerations of international comity and expedi-
ency." 38 The Court reasoned that to permit the validity of the acts of
one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-
tory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of its laws.
Id.
33. See A. KUHN, supra note 21, at 28-33. Professor Kuhn explains that "Pri-
vate International Law or the Conflict of Laws is that branch of legal science
which seeks to determine the application of law when the administration ofjus-
tice requires a choice between two or more systems of law." Id. at 1. Interna-
tional comity, as a doctrinal foundation of private international law in the United
States, recognizes that a sovereign may allow recognition of foreign law in cases
where "no soverign right was surrendered nor the rights of native subjects in-
jured." Id. at 28-29. See also A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 161-66 (1962);
Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966) (historical explanation of
international comity).
34. See A. KUHN, supra note 21, at 29 (in theory, comity "seemed ideal to
modify and temper the rigorous application of territorial law and to accord rec-
ognition to foreign law on local territory"); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a
Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 280, 281-85 (1982). Maier observes that, in American jurisprudence,
the application of comity to recognize foreign law is based on a judicial concern
for "the maintenance of amicable external relations with other nation-states."
Id. at 283.
35. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
36. Id. at 303-04; Underhill, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S.
250 (1897).
37. 246 U.S. at 299-300, 303. The case involved a title dispute over animal
hides seized from a Mexican national by the de facto Mexican government dur-
ing the Mexican Revolution of 1913-1914. Id. at 299-300. The confiscated
hides were sold to an American company which in turn sold them to the defend-
ant. Id. at 299. The plaintiff, as assignee of the original owner of the hides,
brought an action for replevin in the federal circuit court in New Jersey. Id.
Based on the act of state doctrine, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
refusal to pass judgment on the validity of the Mexican act of confiscation. Id. at
303-04.
38. Id. at 303-04.
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/5
courts of another sovereign would "imperil the amicable relations be-
tween governments and vex the peace of nations."'3 9
In Sabbatino, the Court shifted its justification for the act of state
doctrine. 40 The Court concluded that the doctrine had " 'constitu-
tional' underpinnings" arising "out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers."'4 ' The act
of state doctrine, the Court noted, represents an acknowledgement by
the judicial branch that in some cases adjudication of the acts of a for-
eign sovereign may impede foreign relations goals sought by the polit-
ical branches.
42
39. Id. (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd.,
168 U.S. 250 (1897)).
40. 376 U.S. at 427-28. For a discussion of Sabbatino, see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
41. 376 U.S. at 423. The Sabbatino Court stated, "We do not believe that
this doctrine is compelled either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority
... or by some principle of international law." Id. at 421.
42. Id. at 423-27. The Court noted that "[t]he text of the Constitution does
not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the
judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state." Id. at 423.
The Court expressly narrowed the statement by the 0etien Court that "[t]he con-
duct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the Executive and Legislative... Departments." Id. (quoting 0etjen, 246 U.S. at
302) (emphasis added).
The separation of powers rationale relied upon in Sabbatino is widely re-
garded as the modern justification for the act of state doctrine. See, e.g.,
Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 6, at 227-29. While the early cases involving the
act of state doctrine rested on the theories of sovereign immunity and comity,
the second sentence of the Court's formulation of the doctrine in Underhill sug-
gests that the separation of powers rationale may have been a basis for the doc-
trine at its inception: "Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves." 168 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
The Sabbatino Court's deference to the political branches in matters of for-
eign policy is akin to the political question doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (Revised),
supra note 19, § 469 comment a. The political question doctrine provides that
issues political in nature are inappropriate for judicial consideration. J. NOwAK,
R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-20 (2d ed. 1983). The polit-
ical question doctrine was summarized in Baker v. Carr, in which the Supreme
Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The Baker Court noted that where a court is faced
with issues implicating foreign affairs, the issues often fall squarely within the
scope of the political question doctrine:
1986] NOTE 301
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The Sabbatino Court enumerated two broad guidelines for deter-
mining where separation of powers concerns would arise so as to justify
application of the act of state doctrine: (1) where there is no "codifica-
tion or consensus" regarding a facet of international law,4 3 and
(2) where an important issue of foreign policy is implicated. 44 In these
situations, the Court concluded, the political branches may possess ex-
clusive power.4 5
III. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPrIONS TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
United States courts have articulated numerous limitations and ex-
ceptions to the act of state doctrine. 4 6 Of these, the territorial limita-
Not only does resolution of such issues [touching on questions of for-
eign relations] frequently turn on standards that defy judicial applica-
tion, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to
the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely demand
single-voiced statement of the Government's views.
Id. at 211 (footnotes omitted). See alsoJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, supra,
at 198. Thus, in many cases the political question doctrine will render an issue
implicating foreign affairs nonjusticiable. In contrast, under the act of state doc-
trine, a court that clearly has power to decide a case must consider the act of a
foreign sovereign as the rule for its decision where failure to do so may interfere
with the conduct of foreign affairs by the political branches. See Note, Adjudicat-
ing Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51
FORDHAM L. REv. 722, 742-43 (1983). However, as the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has noted, the act of state doctrine and the political question doc-
trine are analogous insofar as they both require courts to recognize that the
executive and legislative branches are better equipped to handle politically sen-
sitive issues than the judicial branch. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
43. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court stated:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or con-
sensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more ap-
propriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since
the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with interna-
tional justice.
Id.
44. Id. The Court observed: "It is also evident that some aspects of inter-
national law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the
less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the
weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches." Id. Thus, is-
sues with little impact on United States foreign policy may not require exclusive
consideration by the political branches. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Recent Development, International Law--Act of State Doctrine-First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 49 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1973).
This commentator observed:
Support exists in varying degrees for assertions that the doctrine
should not apply when (1) the foreign state is at war with the United
States, (2) the foreign state is not recognized by the United States,
(3) the suit is brought to enforce a foreign state's penal or revenue
laws, (4) the act was not performed within the territory of the foreign
302 [Vol. 3 1: p. 291
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state, (5) the foreign government is not in existence at the time of suit,
(6) the act was not fully executed, (7) the act is illegal under the law of
the foreign state, (8) a treaty or other unambiguous agreement covers
the controversy or (9) there is a "clear" violation of international law.
Id. at 223-24 (footnotes omitted).
There also are exceptions for counterclaims, commercial activities, execu-
tive suggestions, and acts of government functionaries done without sovereign
authority. See Comment, supra note 32, at 472 n.16.
The commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine provides that
private commercial acts of a foreign sovereign state do not fall within the act of
state doctrine. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697-
98 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Dunhill, four members of the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of the exception. Id. at 684. The case involved five ma-
jor Cuban cigar exporting companies that were nationalized by Castro's govern-
ment. Id. at 685. Cuba refused to repay the former owners of the companies,
most of whom had fled to the United States, for amounts United States import-
ers had mistakenly paid to the agents of the Cuban government who had taken
over management of the nationalized companies (the "interventors"). Id. at
685-87. The interventors claimed that their repudiation of the obligation to the
former owners was an act of state which must be recognized by a United States
court. Id. at 687. The Dunhill plurality held that the interventors' refusal to re-
turn the money was an exercise of commercial authority not within the act of
state doctrine. Id. at 695-706.
The Allied H court decided not to apply the act of state doctrine; therefore it
did not address the commercial activity exception. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 30 (1985). However, the applicability of the exception was considered and
rejected in two subsequent cases involving the effect of foreign governmental
currency controls on private obligations. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764
F.2d 1101, 1114-16 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222,
225 (2d Cir. 1985). Callejo involved Mexican exchange control regulations that
compelled a Mexican bank to pay substantially less than the face value of certifi-
cates of deposit owned by United States citizens. 764 F.2d at 1106. The certifi-
cate holders alleged that the act of state doctrine was not applicable since the
transaction in the case was a commercial activity. Id. at 1114-16. The court
noted first that the validity of the commercial activity exception was uncertain,
and further stated that were it a valid exception, it would not apply to the Mexi-
can exchange control regulations. Id. at 1114-16 & 1115 n.17. The court stated
that "[t]he power to issue exchange control regulations is paradigmatically sov-
ereign in nature; it is not of a type that a private person can exercise. Unlike
Dunhill, where Cuba repudiated a single debt, here Mexico promulgated com-
prehensive, national decrees in response to a national monetary crisis." Id. at
1116.
In addition, there exists a legislative exception to the act of state doctrine
known as the "Hickenlooper Amendment." See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
Displeased with the Sabbatino decision, Congress sought to modify the result
when it passed the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964. See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of
Law (pt. 5), 87 COM. L.J. 8, 11 (1982). The Hickenlooper Amendment states:
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the
United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other
rights to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a
party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking afterJanuary 1, 1959, by an act of that state
in violation of the principles of international law, including the princi-
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tion 47 and the Bernstein exception 48 are especially pertinent to the Allied
pies of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection:
Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case
in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or
with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pur-
suant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days dura-
tion issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other
taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular
case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a sugges-
tion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). The constitutionality of this amendment was up-
held in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 971-77 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
Notwithstanding the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Sabbatino case continues to
provide the leading authority on the act of state doctrine. See, e.g., Industrial Inv.
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 903 (1980). Application of the amendment has been judicially limited to
cases in which property is confiscated by a foreign sovereign while within the
sovereign's borders, but which is subsequently brought into the United States.
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); French v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 272 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1968). Additionally,
the Hickenlooper Amendment has not been applied to confiscations of property
owned by a national of the foreign sovereign. See F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v.
Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481,487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'dper curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967). For a further discussion of the Hick-
enlooper Amendment, see Henkin, supra note 19, at 178-85; Comment, The Act
of State Doctrine: A History ofJudicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J.
677, 679 n.4 (1977).
The complexity of the exceptions and limitations of the act of state doctrine
is evidenced by the Supreme Court's most recent decision on that subject. See
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). For an analysis of
Dunhill and its impact upon the current status of the act of state doctrine, see
Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of Law (pts. 3-
5), 86 COM. L.J. 438 (1981), 86 COM. LJ. 486 (1981), 87 COM. L.J. 8 (1982).
Professor Dellapenna notes that in the one plurality, two concurring and one
dissenting opinions in Dunhill, the Court articulated the following seven distinct
theories of the act of state doctrine, none of which commanded the support of
more than fourJustices: (1) the doctrine was inapplicable because the Govern-
ment was acting in a commercial capacity; (2) the doctrine functioned exactly
like the political question doctrine; (3) the doctrine was applicable, without ex-
ception, to any situation involving an act of state; (4) the doctrine was not appli-
cable to counterclaims against a foreign sovereign government; (5) the doctrine
was inapplicable when the executive branch has indicated that it would not be
embarrassed by such an inquiry; (6) the doctrine was inapplicable because the
acts in question were not sovereign acts; and (7) the doctrine was inapplicable
because the acts were extraterritorial. Dellapenna (pt. 3), supra, at 444-45.
47. Since its inception, the act of state doctrine has been limited to acts of a
foreign sovereign "done within its own territory." See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (em-
phasis added).
48. The Bernstein exception applies where the Executive has suggested that
the act of state doctrine should not be applied by a court. See Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 772 (1947). For a discussion of the Bernstein exception, see infra notes 101-
20 and accompanying text.
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case.
A. The Territorial Limitation
Since Underhill, courts have limited the act of state doctrine to acts
of a foreign sovereign done "within its own territory."'4 9 In so limiting
the doctrine, United States courts respect the expectations of foreign
governments in territorial sovereignty and further recognize the practi-
cal inability of a court to review and "invalidate" a sovereign act affect-
ing property wholly within the sovereign's dominion. 50  A foreign
government should expect, however, that its extraterritorial acts will be
subject to judicial review and there exists a diminished risk that such
review will affront the foreign government. 5 1
The territorial limitation is straightforward in its application to tan-
gible property with a known location; 52 however, when intangible prop-
erty such as a debt is involved, its application is less clear. 53 Courts are
faced with the difficult problem of siting the intangible property to de-
termine whether the foreign sovereign's act affected property within its
own territory.
The earliest act of state cases involving intangible property arose in
the Second Circuit and involved attempted seizures of intangible prop-
erty by foreign sovereign states. 54 The Second Circuit's determination
49. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. Since Underhill, the territorial limitation to
the act of state doctrine has been consistently recognized. See Zaitzeff & Kunz,
The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 449, 451 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392
F.2d 706, 715 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). The court observed
that act of state decisions plainly "took into consideration the realization that in
most situations there was nothing the United States courts could do ... in any
event." Id. See also Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 49, at 451-52.
51. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706,
715 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). The court stated:
The underlying thought expressed in all of the cases touching on
the Act of State Doctrine is a common-sense one. It is that when a
foreign government performs an act of state which is an accomplished
fact, that is when it has the parties and the res before it and acts in such
a manner as to change the the relationship between the parties touch-
ing the res, it would be an affront to such foreign government for courts
of the United States to hold that such act was a nullity.
Id. See also Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 49, at 451-52.
52. See, e.g., Oetjen, 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (Mexican seizure of animal hides
was act of state within Mexican borders so doctrine was applicable). See also Co-
nant, supra note 28, at 259-60. Professor Conant noted that the act of state doc-
trine was developed to apply to expropriations, nationalizations, or confiscations
of tangible property by foreign sovereign governments. Id.
53. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d
706, 714 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). The Tabacalera court ob-
served, "The situs of an intangible property is about as intangible a concept as is
known to the law." Id.
54. See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
15
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of the situs of intangible property in these early cases focused on either
the sovereign's power to enforce its purported seizure of the debt (en-
forcement test) 55 or on the location of the debtor.5 6
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966). See also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d
854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic
Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976); Comment, supra note 46, at 683-88.
55. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). The government of Iraq issued an
ordinance authorizing seizure of a bank account and stock held in a custodial
account in New York by King Faisel II, who was killed during the Iraqi revolu-
tion of 1958. Id. at 49. Pursuant to the ordinance, the government of Iraq sued
the administrator of Faisel's New York assets for recovery of the assets. Id. at
49-50. Iraq tried to invoke the act of state doctrine with respect to its ordinance
by claiming that the property affected was located in Iraq because King Faisel II
resided and was physically present in Iraq. Id. at 51. The Court rejected this
contention, reasoning that the property would be deemed to be located in Iraq
only if the defendant bank could be compelled by an Iraqi court to deliver the
property of King Faisel that it held in the custodial account to the Iraqi govern-
ment. Id. See also Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973)
("For purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within a for-
eign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect it."), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
Comment, supra note 46, at 684-86. This commentator observes that while dicta
in the Menendez case suggests that if the foreign sovereign has jurisdiction over
the defendant, the "enforcement test" is met, the Second Circuit subsequently
has held that jurisdiction over the defendant is not determinative. Id. at 685
(citing United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976)). This
commentator adds that "[i]t is probable that the original reference to jurisdic-
tion in the Menendez dictum meant only that the power to enforce payment of a
debt generally depends on jurisdiction over the person of the debtor; i.e., juris-
diction is a necessary condition for enforcement, but alone not a sufficient one."
Id. at 685 n.42 (citing Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1365 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682 (1976)). Accord, Rupali Bank v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 403 F. Supp.
1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
56. See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 874 (2d
Cir. 1976). This case involved a United States Company (Cosmic) that imported
jute products from East Pakistan. Id. at 870 n.2. Cosmic owed money to certain
Pakistani jute mills for products it received in 1971. Id. Before Cosmic made
any payment, East Pakistan declared its independence from Pakistan and became
Bangladesh. Id. at 870. The Bangladesh government nationalized the jute mills
and the nationalized companies (Bangladesh plaintiffs) subsequently claimed the
right of payment to the Cosmic debt. Id. at 871. The Bangladesh plaintiffs ar-
gued that the nationalization of the jute mills was an act of state that required
the court to give effect to their claims. Id. The court decided that it would give
effect to the Bangladesh plaintiffs' claims only if the debt owed by Cosmic was
located in Bangladesh. Id. at 872. The court sited the debt in the United States
because that was where the debtor, Cosmic, was found. Id. at 874. The court
noted that this approach was consistent with a longstanding rule "embedded in
American jurisprudence" established in Harris v. Balk. Id. (citing Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905)). The Harris Court held that jurisdiction could be obtained
over a defendant domiciled in another state by attachment of the defendant's
debt in the forum state. 198 U.S. at 221-23. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court stated that the obligation to pay a debt "clings to [the debtor] and accom-
panies him wherever he goes." Id. at 222.
306
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit developed a test akin to
the Second Circuit's enforcement test in Tabacalera SeverianoJorge, S.A. v.
Standard Cigar Co.5 7 The test formulated in Tabacalera, the fait accompli
test,5 8 focused solely on whether the foreign sovereign had the power to
enforce the purported seizure. The Tabacalera case involved a debt
owed to a Cuban tobacco company by a United States importer. 59 The
debt was incurred prior to the tobacco company's nationalization by
Fidel Castro's regime. 60 Severiano Jorge, the sole shareholder and as-
signee of the Cuban company, fled to Florida and subsequently brought
suit to collect the debt owed by the importer.6 1 The United States im-
porter defended against the claim on act of state grounds arguing that
the government of Cuba, by nationalizing the tobacco company, had ac-
quired a right to the debt owed by the United States importer.6 2 In
determining the situs of the debt for act of state purposes, the Tabacalera
court considered whether the Cuban government could have effectively
acquired the debt.6 3 The court concluded that "Cuba was not physically
in a position to perform afait accompli" with respect to expropriating the
debt because the expropriation could not "come to complete fruition
within the dominion of the Cuban government." 64 The Fifth Circuit,
therefore, held that the act of state doctrine was not applicable.
6 5
57. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
58. See 392 F.2d at 715-16. See also Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462
F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.) (applying thefait accompli test), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060
(1972).
59. 392 F.2d at 707.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 708-11. The suit was brought by Tabacalera Severiano Jorge,
S.A., the corporation. Id. at 711. Before the pleadings were completed, the
vice-president of the corporation executed a valid assignment of the corpora-
tion's "interest, claim and demand" in the debt to Severiano Jorge, the sole
shareholder of the corporation, who had fled to Florida. Id.
62. See id. at 713-14.
63. Id. at 715.
64. Id. at 715-16.
65. Id. The court reasoned:
In the case before us, it cannot be doubted that whatever may be
the ordinary concept of the situs of a debt, the government of Cuba was
not physically in a position to perform afait accompli in the nature of the
acquisition by the Cuban government.., of the money owed to Taba-
calera by Standard Cigar Company. It was simply not within the power
of Cuba to accomplish this result. To this extent, we think it clear that
whatever efforts were made by the Cuban government dealing with
Tabacalera, these acts are to be recognized under the Act of State Doc-
trine only insofar as they were able to come to complete fruition within
the dominion of the Cuban government.
Id.
The Tabacalera orfait accompli test was designed by the Fifth Circuit in ac-
cordance with the rationale for the territorial limitation to the act of state doc-
trine. See id. at 715. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that, as a practical matter, a
court is limited in its ability to nullify sovereign acts done within the sovereign's
own territory. Id.
17
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More recently, the Second Circuit confronted the problem of apply-
ing the act of state doctrine to an intangible debt in Garcia v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank. 66 In Garcia, the court did not delineate a situs test per se,
but instead sited the debt by examining the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the debt, including the terms of the contract at issue. 6 7 In
Garcia, a Cuban citizen, Garcia, purchased a certificate of deposit at the
Cuban branch of Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase); by its terms the certifi-
cate was payable at any Chase branch worldwide. 6 8 Castro nationalized
the Cuban branch of Chase, and pursuant to the order of a Cuban minis-
try, the Cuban branch paid the value of Garcia's certificate to the Cuban
government. 6 9 Garcia sued Chase in a United States court to recover
the money due on the certificate. 70 In defense, Chase argued that the
Cuban expropriation of the funds was an act of state that must be recog-
nized by a United States court. 7 1 In determining the situs of the debt
due on the certificate, the court looked at the intent of the parties when
the contract was formed and found that the purpose of the agreement
was to insure that Chase would be responsible for the payment or the
certificate in any event. 7 2 The court also evaluated the terms of the con-
tract, which specified: (1) payment at any Chase branch worldwide, and
(2) a guarantee of the certificate of deposit by Chase's New York of-
fice.73 Based on these circumstances, the court held that the act of state
doctrine was inapplicable.7 4
66. 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984). The case was brought before Circuit
Judges Meskill, Cardamone, and Kearse. Id. at 646.
67. Id. at 650-51. See also Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,
S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weston Banking Corp. v.
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684
(1982) (conducting similar factual inquiries).
68. 735 F.2d at 646.
69. Id. at 647.
70. Id. at 647-48.
71. Id. at 650. The Garcia court determined that Chase's argument that the
appropriation of funds fell within the act of state doctrine was correct if the situs
of its debt was Cuba. Id. The court questioned, however, whether Cuba actually
had seized the debt or whether it seized "merely a payment of a sum equal to it."
Id.
72. Id. at 650-51. Although the Garcia court discussed the Tabacalera orfait
accompli test, the court did not perform such an analysis. Id. at 650 n.5. For a
discussion of thefait accompli test, see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
73. 735 F.2d at 646, 650-51.
74. Id. at 651. In finding the doctrine inapplicable, the court commented:
We are not challenging the validity of the Cuban government's actions
here and Cuba has shown no interest in the outcome of this case. We
are simply resolving a private dispute between an American bank and
one of its depositors. The result we reach will have no international
repercussions. Chase cannot use the act of state doctrine as a defense
because the doctrine is not implicated.
Id.
Judge Kearse wrote a dissenting opinion in Garcia criticizing the court's fail-
ure to recognize that the debts were collectible in Cuba. Id. (KearseJ., dissent-
18
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Two recent cases in the Second and Fifth Circuits, arising out of the
Mexican economic crisis, further demonstrate the lack of accord as to
which situs test applies to intangible property. 75 In 1982, the Mexican
economy suffered from the sharp fall in oil prices which eroded a source
of foreign exchange that Mexico needed to repay its enormous foreign
debt.76 In an effort to stabilize Mexico's economy, the Mexican Ministry
of the Treasury and Public Credit issued several decrees mandating that
all domestic obligations for payments in foreign currency, including dol-
lar deposits made and payable in Mexico, be performed by delivering
pesos at a "special exchange rate" for foreign currency obligations. 77
Holders of dollar-denominated certificates of deposit in Mexican banks
received substantially less than the free market rate when their certifi-
cates matured, and as a result, several lawsuits arose in United States
courts.
78
ing). Judge Kearse noted that the plaintiffs had agreed to payment at any Chase
branch worldwide, including Cuba. Id. at 652 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge
Kearse invoked the "enforcement test" of locating an intangible property and
reasoned that "[t]he applicability of the act of state doctrine to the present case
depends on the power of the Cuban government to enforce or collect these
debts within Cuba." Id. at 651 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Since
the debt was collected by the Cuban government pursuant to a valid decree at a
place where the plaintiff could have collected it, Judge Kearse reasoned that the
debt was extinguished. Id. at 652 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Cf. Perez v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, 474 N.Y.S.2d 689, cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 366 (1984). The Perez case involved virtually the same facts as Garcia,
but the New York Court of Appeals held the act of state doctrine applicable
based on reasoning similar to Judge Kearse's dissenting opinion in Garcia. Id. at
470-71, 463 N.E.2d at 9, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 693. For a discussion contrasting the
Garcia and Perez opinions, see Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving
Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901, 920-26 (1985).
75. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Callejo v.
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
76. For an overview of the development of the Mexican economic crisis, see
4 A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM § 9.61 (2d ed. 1984).
See also Hoagland, Overview: Perspective from an American Lawyer in Mexico, 18 INT'L
LAw. 287 (1984); Tapia, Mexico's Debt Restructuring: The Evolving Solution, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1984); Zamora, Peso-Dollar Economics and the Imposition
of Foreign Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (1984).
77. See 4 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 76, § 9.61. The Mexican Ministry of the
Treasury and Public Credit issued the first decree in August 1983. Id.
The "special exchange rate" provided fewer pesos per dollar than the pre-
vailing free market rate. See id. Professor Lowenfeld demonstrated the effect of
this special exchange rate by discussing a situation in which the prescribed ex-
change rate was 69.5 persos per dollar:
Purchase of dollars was not forbidden. But if a person had a 10,000
dollar account at a bank in Mexico and needed dollars, he would be
entitled to withdraw 695,000 pesos; he could then take the pesos to the
foreign exchange market and if dollars were available he could
purchase them at the market rate of, say 100 pesos to the dollar, so that
he would wind up with U.S. $6,950, a 30 percent loss.
Id. § 9.61 n.j (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F.
19
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In Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C.,79 plaintiffs sought to recover 900,000
dollars lost as a result of the artificial exchange rate prescribed by the
Mexican government.8 0 In considering whether the act of state doctrine
applied, the Second Circuit focused on the situs of the property in ques-
tion, which it deemed to be "Bancomer's obligation to pay the contrac-
tually mandated return on plaintiffs' investment."8 1 Instead of relying
on its approach in Garcia,8 2 the Second Circuit invoked the Tabacalera or
fait accompli theory of situs analysis8 3 and held that the actions by the
Mexican government were an accomplished act with respect to the prop-
erty.8 4 The Braka court found that the situs of intangible property had
been "contractually mandated" because the certificates of deposit
named Mexico City as the place of deposit and as the place for payment
of the principal and interest.8 5 The Braka court reasoned, therefore,
that the Mexican government "Ha[d] the parties and the res before it and
act[ed] in such a manner as to change the relationship between the par-
ties touching the res," so that the Mexican act was afait accompli.8 6 Thus,
the court concluded that since the Mexican decrees affected property
located within Mexican territory, the act of state doctrine barred
Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Braka v. Mul-
tibanco Comermex, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
79. 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 223. At the time the plaintiffs in Braka purchased the certificates
of deposit, the defendant, Bancomer, was a privately run Mexican bank. Id. In
September 1982, Mexico issued decrees nationalizing Mexican banks, including
Bancomer. Id. The officially prescribed exchange rate at issue in Braka was ap-
proximately 70-80 pesos per dollar while the actual market rate of exchange was
135-150 pesos per dollar. Id.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the plaintiffs' case on the basis of the act of state doctrine. Braka v.
Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
81. 762 F.2d at 224.
82. Id. at 225 (citing Garcia, 735 F,2d at 646, 650). For a discussion of the
Garcia case, see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. The Braka court dis-
tinguished the Garcia case, noting that in Garcia the certificates specified that
repayment could be made at any branch worldwide, while in Braka the certifi-
cates were payable only in Mexico; therefore, the situs of debt in Braka existed
wholly within the boundaries of Mexico. 762 F.2d at 225 (citing Garcia, 735 F.2d
at 646, 650).
83. 762 F.2d at 224-25 (citing Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715-16). For a discus-
sion of the Tabacalera case and its situs analysis, see supra notes 57-65 and accom-
panying text.
84. 762 F.2d at 224.
85. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the debt was located in New York because sev-
eral purchases of certificates were made by tendering checks to Bancomer's New
York agency and because the plaintiffs received some interest payments in New
York. Id. The Braka court rejected this argument, stating: "It is clear that the
accomplishment of interbank transfers, which was the extent of the New York
agency's participation, does not change the contractually mandated situs of
plaintiffs' property." Id. at 224-25.
86. Id. at 225 (brackets supplied by the court) (quoting Tabacalera, 392 F.2d
at 715).
310
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recovery.87
In Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A .,88 a case involving virtually the same facts
as Braka, the Fifth Circuit also found the act of state doctrine applicable
after concluding that the situs of the property was Mexico. 8 9 The Calejo
court, however, explicitly rejected thefait accompli test, which it had for-
mulated in Tabacalera, as a means of determining the situs of the depos-
its. a 0 The court reasoned that thefait accompli test was designed for suits
involving attempts by a foreign government to collect a debt rather than
attempts to avoid payment of debt.9 1 The court stated:
If we simply apply the Tabacalera test, the situs of the certificates
would clearly be Mexico, since Mexico can enforce the collec-
tion of debts owed by Bancomer, a Mexican domiciliary. In
that event, the act of state doctrine would apply whenever a
foreign state seized debts owed by its banks, no matter how
many ties the debts had to this country.
We do not think Tabacalera intended such results.
9 2
87. Id. at 225-26.
88. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 1125. Beginning in 1979 or 1980, William and Adelfa Callejo,
United States citizens, purchased certificates of deposit from defendant
Bancomer, a then privately run Mexican bank. Id. at 1105. The four certificates
of deposit at issue were denominated in United States dollars and specified Mex-
ico City as the place of payment. Id. at 1106. Following the enactment of the
Mexican exchange control regulations, the Callejos' certificates were payable in
pesos at a rate substantially below the market rate. Id. As a result, the Callejos
renewed two of the certificates due in August 1982 and filed the present suit. Id.
The Callejo court addressed three issues in addition to the act of state de-
fense. First, the court concluded that Bancomer was not entitled to immunity
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id. at 1106-12. For a discussion
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see supra note 6. Second, the court
found that were it to adopt the commercial activity exception to the act of state
doctrine, the exception would not apply in Callejo since the activity in question,
Mexico's promulgation of exchange controls, was a government act. 764 F.2d at
1114-16. For a discussion of the commercial activity exception, see supra note
46. Third, the court examined whether the treaty exception to the act of state
doctrine was applicable. 764 F.2d at 1116-21. In particular, the plaintiff alleged
that the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement (Bretton Woods
Agreement) constituted a treaty that was violated by the Mexican exchange con-
trol regulations. Id. at 1117-18. The court found it unnecessary to rule on this
issue since the International Monetary Fund indicated that the Mexican regula-
tions were consistent with the Bretton Woods Agreement. Id. at 1119. For a
discussion of the potential applicability of the Bretton Woods Agreement to
such cases, see infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
90. 764 F.2d at 1122-23 (citing Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715). For a discus-
sion of Tabacalera, see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
91. 764 F.2d at 1123.
92. Id. (citations omitted). The court added:
The power to collect a debt is for the benefit of the creditor, not the
debtor; the fact that a debt can be enforced by the creditor in one fo-
rum should not be the basis of depriving him of his ability to enforce
the debt in a different forum. Otherwise, the sword of the creditor
1986] NOTE
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Citing Garcia, the court determined the location of the intangible
property by examining the "incidents of the debt." '93 In this analysis,
the court considered that the certificates were issued and carried by a
Mexican bank, and called for payment in Mexico.94 The court concluded
that the certificates were located in Mexico, and that therefore the act of
state doctrine defeated the plaintiffs claims against the Mexican
banks. 95
Under any of the foregoing situs tests, a finding that property is
located in the United States bars application of the act of state doctrine,
but it does not necessarily preclude judicial recognition of the foreign
sovereign's acts. Several courts have recognized extraterritorial acts of
state that are consistent with United States law and policy.96 For exam-
would become a shield for the debtor. Since we do not believe that
debts owed by foreign banks to American nationals are always sitused
in the foreign country-and consequently do not believe that the act of
state doctrine always applies to such debts-we do not apply the Taba-
calera test here.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 1123-24 & 1123 n.31 (citing Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650). The Callejo
court also cited the following cases as support for its "incidents of the debt" test:
Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica, 570 F, Supp. 870, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weston Banking Corp. v.
Turkiye Govanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 456 N.Y.S.2d 684
(1982). Calleo, 764 F.2d at 1123 n.31.
In applying the incidents of the debt test, the Calejo court identified the
following factors: (1) the place where the certificates were issued and are car-
ried; (2) the place of payment; (3) "the intent of the parties . . .regarding the
applicable law"; and (4) "the involvement of the American banking system in the
transaction." 764 F.2d at 1123 (footnote omitted). The court's determination
that the certificates were sited in Mexico was based on two of these four fac-
tors-that the certificates were issued and payable in Mexico. Id. at 1124.
94. 764 F.2d at 1124.
95. Id. at 1125.
96. See RESTATEMENT (Revised), supra note 19, § 469 reporter's note 4;
Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 49, at 461-64. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1981); United
Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976); Menendez v.
Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Republic of Iraq
v. First City Nat'l Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027
(1966); F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481,487-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967).
Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937). Belmont and Pink both involved the Soviet Union's nationaliza-
tion of property located in the United States that was owned by Soviet citizens.
See, e.g., Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-11. The Soviet Union signed an executive agree-
ment with the United States (the Litvinov Assignment) under which the United
States agreed to recognize and make claims pursuant to the Soviet Nationaliza-
tion decrees confiscating property in New York. Id. at 211-13. Based on the
Litvinov Assignment, the Court in Pink recognized the validity of the confisca-
tory decrees which in the absence of an executive agreement may not have been
22
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ple, in Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank,9 7 the Second Circuit,
after first deciding that an Iraqi ordinance was not within the act of state
doctrine, 9 8 examined whether the ordinance was consistent with United
States law and policy, 99 reasoning that if the ordinance were consistent,
the court would give it extraterritorial recognition.' 0 0
B. The Bernstein Exception
The Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine draws its name
from two Second Circuit decisions-Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe
Anonyme l' l and Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappi. 10 2 In these cases, the plaintiff sought to recover the value
of a shipping vessel that he had transferred to the Nazi government
under duress during World War 11.103 Although the Nazi seizure fell
within the scope of the act of state doctrine, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the doctrine was inapplicable in situations where the execu-
tive branch clearly indicated that it did not object to judicial examination
of the acts of a foreign state. 10 4 Finding no such indication in the first
Bernstein case, the Second Circuit applied the act of state doctrine to the
Nazi seizure. 10 5 In the second Bernstein case, the Second Circuit relied
on a letter from the acting legal adviser to the State Department to avoid
application of the act of state doctrine. ' 0 6 The State Department's letter
recognized since they may have been viewed as confiscations against the law and
policy of the United States. See Note, supra note 74, at 930 n.147.
97. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). For a
discussion of the facts in Republic of Iraq, see supra note 55.
98. 353 F.2d at 50-51. The court noted that traditionally the act of state
doctrine "applies only to a taking by a foreign sovereign of property within its
own territory." Id. at 51.
99. Id. at 51-52.
100. Id. at 51. The court, however, found the ordinance inconsistent since
it amounted to a confiscation "contrary to our public policy and shocking to our
sense ofjustice." Id. (citing Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N.Y. Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369,
378, 189 N.E. 456, 460 (1934)).
101. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
102. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modified per curiam, 210 F.2d 375 (1954).
After plaintiff Bernstein's first case was dismissed, he brought this separate ac-
tion against another defendant. 173 F.2d at 72.
103. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d at
247. The Nazi government sold the vessel to a Belgian company during World
War II. Id. The vessel was sunk during the war and insurance proceeds of
100,000 pounds were paid to another Belgian company which held these pro-
ceeds in the defendant's account. Id. The plaintiff attempted to attach this debt
by filing his complaint in federal district court in New York. Id.
104. Id. at 248-51. Judge Learned Hand stated: "the only relevant consid-
eration is how far our Executive has indicated any positive intent to relax the
doctrine that our courts shall not entertain actions of the kind at bar; some posi-
tive evidence of such an intent being necessary." Id. at 251.
105. Id. at 251-52.
106. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
schappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
1986] NOTE 313
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announced the policy of the executive to relieve United States courts
from any restraints on their ability to adjudicate confiscatory acts by the
Nazi government.10 7
The Supreme Court most recently assessed the Bernstein exception
in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,10 8 a case that left the
viability of the exception uncertain. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
plurality and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, wholly
approved of the Bernstein exception.' 0 9 He reasoned that where the ex-
ecutive indicates approval of judicial resolution, the rationale of giving
deference to the political branch in matters of foreign policy ceases to be
viable."10 Six Justices, however, disapproved of the Bernstein excep-
tion.'1 1 Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, asserted that under
the Bernstein exception the Court would become handmaiden for the ex-
107. Id. The letter as quoted in the court's opinion stated in part:
1) This Government has consistently opposed the forcible acts of
dispossession of a discriminatory and confiscatory nature practiced by
the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to their controls....
3) The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in
the United States for the restitution of identifiable property . . . lost
through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in
Germany, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the ex-
ercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi
officials.
Id. Based on this expression of foreign policy, the court amended its earlier
mandate that had precluded it from adjudicating the confiscatory acts of the Nazi
government. Id. (citing 173 F.2d at 75-76).
108. 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (plurality opinion). In 1960, First National City
Bank (First National) was owed $10 million by the predecessor of Banco Na-
cional de Cuba (Banco Nacional). Id. at 760. This loan was secured by a pledge
of United States Government bonds. Id. Subsequently, Castro nationalized all
of First National's Cuban branches. Id. In retaliation, First National sold the
United States bonds to satisfy the loan, with proceeds in excess of the debt by
1.8 million dollars. Id. at 760-61. Banco Nacional sued First National in a
United States court to recover the excess proceeds; First National counter-
claimed, asserting an action for damages resulting from the expropriation of its
property by the Cuban government. Id. at 761. Banco Nacional claimed that the
nationalization of First National's Cuban branches was an act of state that must
be recognized by United States courts. See id. at 761. The legal adviser of the
Department of State advised the Court that "where the Executive publicly ad-
vises the Court that the act of state doctrine need not be applied, the Court
should proceed to examine the legal issues raised .. " Id. at 764. The legal
advisor further asserted that there existed an exception to the act of state doc-
trine for counterclaims: "The Department of State believes that the act of state
doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's counter-
claim or set-off against the Government of Cuba in this or like cases." Id.
109. Id. at 768.
110. Id. Justice Rehnquist relied on a common law maxim that "[t]he rea-
son of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 288 (4th ed. 1951)).
111. Justice Douglas concurred. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Powell concurred. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 776-93
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ecutive branch "which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from
the fire but not others'." ' 12 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Powell expressed discomfort with an exception to the act of state doc-
trine that requires the Court to receive permission from the executive
branch."13 Finally, in a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, denounced the Bern-
stein exception on several grounds."l 4
Primarily, Justice Brennan noted that Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion was premised on the theory that a court will not, by failure to
apply the act of state doctrine, embarrass the executive branch if the
executive branch has indicated its approval of nonapplication of the doc-
trine. 5 Justice Brennan asserted that avoidance of embarrassment to
the executive branch is only one policy justification for the act of state
doctrine.1 6 Relying on Sabbatino, Justice Brennan urged that courts in-
voke the doctrine when there is a lack of consensus among nations as to
the applicable rule of law.' 17 Additionally, Justice Brennan pointed out
that the act of state doctrine recognizes the superior power of the Exec-
utive in the conduct of foreign affairs; for example, where a foreign gov-
ernment has affected mass expropriations, the executive branch and not
the judiciary has power to ensure that all similarly situated plaintiffs are
treated equally.' 18
112. Id. at 773 (Douglas J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist addressed this
issue in his plurality opinion:
Our holding is in no sense an abdication of the judicial function to
the Executive Branch. The judicial power of the United States extends
to this case, and the jurisdictional standards established by Congress
for adjudication by the federal courts have been met by the parties.
The only reason for not deciding the case by use of otherwise applica-
ble legal principles would be the fear that legal interpretation by the
judiciary of the act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory might
frustrate the conduct of this country's foreign relations. But the branch
of the government responsible for the conduct of those foreign rela-
tions has advised us that such a consequence need not be feared in this
case. Thejudiciary is therefore free to decide the case without the limi-
tations that would otherwise be imposed upon it by the judicially cre-
ated act of state doctrine.
Id. at 768 (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell observed: "I would
be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive
the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the
name of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me to conflict with that
very doctrine." Id.
114. Id. at 776-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 785-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion, see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
116. 406 U.S. at 785-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 785-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
427-28)). For a discussion of Sabbatino and the justifications it established for
applying the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
118. 406 U.S. at 786-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted
Sabbatino:
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Notwithstanding the uncertain validity of the Bernstein exception fol-
lowing First National City Bank, the exception has resurfaced in subse-
quent lower court decisions.11 9 In the Second Circuit, suggestions from
the executive branch, along with other factors, have been alluded to in
cases involving the act of state doctrine; however, in each case, the court
did not specify whether the executive suggestion controlled the applica-
bility of the doctrine.' 20
IV. ALLIED BANK INTERNATIONAL V. BANCO CREDITO
AGRICOLA DE CARTAGO
In 1981, Costa Rica was burdened with an enormous foreign debt
and with the effects of the worldwide recession, which had depressed the
prices of coffee and bananas, its chief exports. 12 1 In an effort to cope
with the flight of foreign currency from its country, the Costa Rican gov-
ernment issued directives effectively prohibiting the payments of exter-
nal debt with foreign currency.' 2 2 As a result of these directives, Costa
Following an expropriation of any significance, the Executive engages
in diplomacy aimed to assure that United States citizens who are
harmed are compensated fairly. Representing all claimants of this
country, it will often be able, either by bilateral or multilateral talks, by
submission to the United Nations, or by the employment of economic
and political sanctions, to achieve some degree of general redress. Ju-
dicial determinations of invalidity of title can, on the other hand, have
only an occasional impact, since they depend on the fortuitous circum-
stance of the property in question being brought into this country.
Id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431).
119. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658 F.2d
903, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
658 F.2d 875, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1981). Cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston (Int'l) v.
Banco Nacionl de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
120. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 658
F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (in addition to absence of executive suggestion, court
considered that subject claim was based on breach of agreement, not on viola-
tion of international law; case remanded); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (in addition to executive sugges-
tion, court noted that there was no showing that adjudication would "interfere
with delicate foreign relations," as counterclaim did not exceed value of sover-
eign's claim; act of state doctrine was inapplicable). For a criticism of the Bern-
stein exception, see Note, Acts of State and the Conflict of Laws, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV.
234, 238-40 (1960). This commentator points out that executive suggestions
have long been an acceptable means for the executive branch to intervene in a
case, but asserts that such suggestions should not be determinative of the out-
come of the case. Id. at 240 & n.44 (citing Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)). See also Editorial Comment, Has the Supreme Court
Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
121. See Canas, Costa Rica: Another View, BARRON'S, July 5, 1982, at 36, col.
2. According to Canas, inflation in Costa Rica in 1982 was close to 90%, unem-
ployment exceeded 20%, and foreign debt reached $3.2 billion. Id. Approxi-
mately $1.4 billion of Costa Rica's foreign debt was owed to private lenders; the
majority were United States banks. Id. See also Kallen, Yes, We Have No Bananas,
FORBES, July 1, 1985, at 97.
122. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.
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Rican banks were temporarily unable to make payments due on notes to
foreign creditors, which prompted the creditors to sue the Costa Rican
banks in the United States.
123
In Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Allied, a banking
syndicate comprised of thirty-nine United States and European
banks, 124 brought suit against three Costa Rican banks. 12 5 The district
court concluded that the act of state doctrine was applicable since a
judgment against the Costa Rican banks could potentially cause embar-
rassment to the executive branch in its relationship with the Costa Rican
government. 1 26
Supp. 1440, 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
In August 1981, the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Central Bank), a govern-
ment controlled bank, passed a resolution prohibiting public sector entities from
paying principal or interest on external debt with foreign currency. 566 F. Supp.
at 1442. In November 1981, the President of Costa Rica and the Ministry of
Finance promulgated an executive decree which prohibited any institution in
Costa Rica from making external payments on debts without approval from the
Central Bank in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Id.
123. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F.
Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 30 (1985).
124. A syndicate is defined as "[a]n association of individuals, formed for
the purpose of conducting and carrying out some particular business transac-
tion, ordinarily of a financial character, in which the members are mutually inter-
ested." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1300 (5th ed. 1979).
Loans to foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are often made from
a syndicate of banks rather than from a single banking institution. See Clarke &
Farrar, supra note 4, at 229. The foreign borrower will typically seek out a prin-
cipal United States bank to act as "manager" in arranging a syndicate of lenders.
Id. Another principal bank will act as an "agent" for the syndicate with responsi-
bilities for overseeing the flow of funds between the parties involved in the loan
transaction. Id. at 230. The benefit of such an approach is that a foreign bor-
rower can request more money than it could from any one private lender. Id. at
229.
125. See Allied, 566 F. Supp. at 1442. The three defendant Costa Rican
banks were Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Banco Anglo Costarricense, and
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Id. at 1440. At present, these banks are wholly
owned by the government of Costa Rica and are subject to the direct control of
the Central Bank of Costa Rica. See id. at 1441-42.
While this action was still pending in the district court, the Costa Rican gov-
ernment initiated negotiations for the rescheduling of the defendant banks' obli-
gations to the Allied Syndicate. Allied I, supra note 10, at 745. Thereafter, an
agreement was reached between the defendant banks and all but one of the 39
banks in the Allied Syndicate. Id. One bank, Fidelity Union Trust Company of
New Jersey, refused to enter into the agreement and on behalf of it alone, Allied
pressed the subsequent appeal of the case. Id. The Costa Rican banks neverthe-
less proceeded to make payments to the other thirty-eight banks under this refi-
nancing agreement. Id. For a further discussion of the settlement, see infra
notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
126. 566 F. Supp. at 1444. District Judge Griesa determined that Costa
Rica imposed the directive in response to a serious national economic crisis;
therefore, a judicial determination in favor of Allied would put the judicial
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On the first appeal (Allied /),127 the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision; however, it did not reach the issue of whether the
act of state doctrine was applicable. 128 The Allied I court analyzed
whether it should uphold the Costa Rican directives based on their con-
sistency with United States law and policy.
1 29
branch at odds with the Costa Rican government on a matter of central impor-
tance to Costa Rica and hence risk embarrassment in the executive branch's rela-
tionship with Costa Rica. Id. at 1443-44.
Within days of the district court decision in Allied, ChiefJudge Motley ruled
on Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, a case involving virtually the
same facts as Allied, and reached an opposite conclusion regarding the act of
state doctrine. 570 F. Supp. 870, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The Libra court concluded that applicability of the act of state doctrine
turned on whether the debt was located in Costa Rica. Id. at 878. The court
noted that the test employed in the Second Circuit for determining the situs of
intangible property focused on whether the sovereign could enforce the pay-
ment of the debt. Id. at 880-81. The court, however, concluded that this ap-
proach was not applicable to the facts of Libra since it was designed for cases
involving an attempt by a foreign sovereign to confiscate debts owed by a United
States national. Id. The Libra facts involved just the opposite-a debt owed by a
foreign national to a United States bank. Id.
In place of the "enforcement" test the court focused on the "legal inci-
dents" of the debt in order to site the debt. Id. at 881-82 (citing Weston Bank-
ing Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 57 N.Y.2d 315, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 456
N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982)). For a discussion of the "legal incidents" test for siting
intangible property, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Chief Judge
Motley concluded that at the time Costa Rica promulgated its directives the situs
of the debt was New York, based on the following "legal incidents": (1) Banco
Nacional consented to jurisdiction in the United States; (2) it agreed to have the
loan documents construed in accordance with New York law; (3) it agreed to
make payments in New York; (4) it agreed to make payments as provided in the
promissory notes irrespective of any charges or withholdings imposed in con-
nection with the notice; and (5) it owned considerable assets in the United
States. 570 F. Supp. at 881-82.
After determining that the act of state doctrine was not applicable, the court
noted that it would only give extraterritorial effect to the Costa Rican directives
if they were consistent with United States law and policy. Id. at 882. The court
found that the directives confiscated property without adequate compensation,
and as such, were repugnant to the United States Constitution. Id. The Libra
court also rejected the defendant's argument that nonenforcement of the loan
agreement was permitted by article VIII, § 2(b), of the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment. Id. at 896-902 (memorandum opinion denying defendant's motion for
reargument of plaintiff's summary judgment motion). For a discussion of the
potential application of this provision in cases involving transactions with debtor
countries, see supra note 12. The Libra court granted summary judgment in
favor of the United States creditors. 570 F. Supp. at 896.
127. Allied I, supra note 10. The panel for Allied I and Allied H comprised
Judges Meskill and Pierce with Judge Metzner, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Id. at 743; Allied
Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
128. Allied I, supra note 10, at 745-46.
129. Id. at 746. For a discussion of the principle of comity, see supra notes
30-39 and accompanying text. Although the court labeled this a "comity" analy-
sis, the court's analysis was actually more in line with the law and policy analysis
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The court applied this "comity" analysis rather than an act of state
analysis because it deemed the question of whether the directives were
consistent with United States law and policy to be controlling.' 30 The
court reasoned that the act of state doctrine would apply only if the
debts were located in Costa Rica.' 3 ' If, however, the debts' situs was
the United States, the directives could still be recognized by the court if
they were consistent with United States law and policy. 13 2 The court
therefore concluded that the act of state doctrine did not control.' 33
In finding the Costa Rican directives consistent with United States
law and policy, the Allied I court principally relied on an analogy to
United States bankruptcy law. 13 4 In support of this analogy, the court
relied on Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard 135 in which the Supreme
Court held that United States citizens who owned bonds issued by Can-
ada Southern Railway, a governmentally owned corporation, were re-
quired to adhere to Canada's reorganization of the railway's debt. 13 6
performed in past Second Circuit cases where the act of state doctrine was
deemed inapplicable. For a discussion of this "second step" taken in prior act of
state cases, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
130. Allied I, supra note 10, at 745-47.
131. Id. at 746.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id. The court found several other factors indicating that the Costa Ri-
can directives were consistent with United States law and policy. See id. at 744-
46. The court first noted that even though Costa Rica had defaulted on inter-
governmental loans with the United States, the Reagan Administration had indi-
cated its continuing support and its commitment to provide economic assistance
to Costa Rica. Id. at 745. The court quoted the following advice from the exec-
utive branch:
Continuation of U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent with the
commitment of this Administration and in Congress to help Costa Rica
regain economic viability. We therefore regard such assistance, which
is designed to help the Government with financial and management re-
forms and with needed credit to the private sector, as vital and in the
national interest. We are hopeful that bilateral debt restructuring will
be completed within the next several months.
Id. (quoting Letters from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to Speaker of the
House Thomas P. O'Neill (Mar. 18, 1983 & Oct. 11, 1983)). Further, the court
noted that the House of Representatives expressed support for Costa Rica "as
that country responds to the current economic crises." Id. (citing H.R. Con.
Res. 423, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 10,206 (1982); H.R. Con. Res.
194, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CONG. REc. 10,350 (1983)). Finally, the court
noted a Paris Club Agreed Minute that supported the restructuring of Costa
Rica's external debt. Id. The Paris Club is an informal organization of creditor
countries, including the United States, which periodically meets under the chair-
manship of an official of the French treasury to set forth guidelines for
rescheduling the debts of a country seeking relief. See generally Rieffel, The Paris
Club, 1978-1983, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1984) (discussing history,
objectives, and procedures of Paris Club).
135. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
136. AlliedI, supra note 10, at 746 (citing Gebhard 109 U.S. 527 (1883)). The
Allied I court relied on the following reasoning in Gebhard:
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The Allied I court compared the Gebhard situation to the Costa Rican di-
rectives and extended the court's reasoning in Gebhard to chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code, which automatically stays all collec-
tion actions against a party that has filed an application for reorganiza-
tion. 137 The Allied I court concluded that Costa Rica, like a petitioner in
bankruptcy, acted in good faith in attempting to defer its payments while
renegotiating its debt; therefore, its directives were consistent with
United States law and policy.
138
On rehearing (Allied II), the same panel of judges 139 reversed and
vacated its earlier decision.140 Based on views articulated by the execu-
tive branch in an amicus curiae brief, the Allied H court concluded that
the directives were inconsistent with United States law and policy.' 4 '
The Allied II court noted that the amicus brief urged that United States
policy does not support a unilateral decision by a debtor nation to
[The plan] is in entire harmony with the spirit of bankrupt laws, the
binding force of which, upon those who are subject to the jurisdiction,
is recognized by all civilized nations. It is not in conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States, which ... allows Congress "to establish
... uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United
States." . . . Under these circumstances the true spirit of international
comity requires that schemes of this character, legalized at home,
should be recognized in other countries.
Id. (quoting Gebhard, 109 U.S. at 539).
137. Allied I, supra note 10, at 746 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 362, 901(a)
(1982)).
138. Id. at 746-47. For a discussion of Costa Rica's renegotiation efforts,
see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 127.
140. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Allied I1), 757
F.2d 516, 519-20 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
141. 757 F.2d at 519-20. The executive branch filed an amicus curiae brief
urging reversal of the Allied I decision. Id. Of counsel on the brief were the
State Department, the Department of Treasury, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Justice Department. Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, Allied II, 757 F.2d 516 (on file at office of Villanova Law Review).
An amicus curiae brief urging reversal of Allied I also was filed by the New
York Clearing House Association. Brief for the New York Clearing House Asso-
ciation as Amicus Curiae, Allied II, 757 F.2d 516 (on file at office of Villanova Law
Review). The New York Clearing House Association is an association of twelve
leading New York City banks which appears as amicus curiae before appellate
courts in cases involving important questions pertinent to banking. Id. at 2. An
amicus brief was also filed jointly by the Rule of Law Committee and the Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council. Brief for the Rule of Law Committee and the
National Foreign Trade Council, Inc. as Amii Curiae, Allied II, 757 F.2d 516 (on
file at office of Villanova Law Review). "The Rule of Law Committee is an infor-
mal, voluntary association of legal representatives from major American mul-
tinational corporations engaged in worldwide export, banking, petroleum
manufacturing, and construction activities." Id. at 1. The National Foreign
Trade Council is a nonprofit corporation concerned with international trade and
investment; corporate membership of the council accounts for over 70% of all
United States exports and United States foreign direct private investment. Id.
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restructure its obligations. 142 Instead, the Government's amicus brief
indicated that the executive supports the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) 14 3 restructuring procedure, which encourages cooperative and
multilateral adjustment of international debt problems.' 4 4
The court proceeded to address the act of state defense raised by
the defendant Costa Rican banks, stating that application of the act of
state doctrine to the facts in Allied depended on the situs of the debt at
the time the Costa Rican directives were promulgated. 14 5
The court concluded that the determination of the situs of a debt is
different for act of state purposes than it is for "ordinary" purposes.
14 6
Relying on the fait accompli theory set forth in Tabacalera for its act of
state situs analysis, 14 7 the Allied H court concluded that since Costa Rica
could not "wholly extinguish" the Costa Rican banks' obligation to
timely pay United States dollars to Allied in New York, the situs of the
debt was not Costa Rica. 148
The court also applied an "ordinary" situs analysis and again con-
cluded that the situs of the debt was not Costa Rica. 14 9 The court's
"ordinary" situs test involved a balancing of the interests of the United
States against the interests of Costa Rica in siting the debt within its
142. 757 F.2d at 519.
143. Id. at 519. For a discussion of the International Monetary Fund, see
supra note 12.
144. 757 F.2d at 519. The brief for the United States as amicus curiae
stated:
Debtor countries have generally developed economic adjustment
programs approved by the IMF, while financing by the IMF and others
has been provided to ease the pace at which the adjustment must be
accomplished. The IMF... has served as an objective mediator in the
establishment of external financing requirements, and accordingly has
frequently been a catalyst in mobilizing the financing essential to the
viability of these programs .... United States policy has been strongly
supportive of this approach to resolve the current international debt
problem.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Allied 11, 757 F.2d 516 (foot-
note omitted).
145. 757 F.2d at 520-22. The court initially observed that application of
the act of state doctrine depends on the degree of impact a judicial decision
would have on international relations. Id. at 520-21 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
427-28, 431-33). Also, the court noted that it may be guided by a foreign policy
viewpoint that has been articulated by the executive. 757 F.2d at 521 n.2. How-
ever, the court recognized that the act of state doctrine is "ultimately and al-
ways" a judicial doctrine, and thus an executive articulation cannot be wholly
determinative. Id. Referring to the constitutional underpinnings of the doc-
trine, the court further stated that a judicial decision should not have the effect
of embarrassing the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. Id. at 521.
146. Id. at 521.
147. For a discussion of thefait accompli test for siting intangible property,
see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
148. 757 F.2d at 521 (citing Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715-16).
149. Id.
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territory. 150 The court concluded that under both the fait accompli and
"ordinary" situs analyses, the situs of the Costa Rican bank debt was the
United States, and therefore, the act of state doctrine was
inapplicable. 15'
Having rejected the Costa Rican banks' act of state defense, the Al-
lied 11 court analyzed whether international comity would support recog-
nition of the Costa Rican directives by a United States court.15 2 The
court repeated its earlier analysis which found the Costa Rican directives
contrary to the IMF debt resolution strategy. 153 Additionally, the court
found that judicial recognition of the directives would be contrary to
United States contract law. 154 Specifically, the Costa Rican banks had
agreed, as an express term of the loan contract, that their repayment
obligation would not be excused by a failure of the Costa Rican Central
Bank to make available the necessary United States dollars for repay-
ment.15 5 The court concluded that to give effect to the Costa Rica di-
rectives would vitiate this express provision of the contract. 156 Based on
the foregoing, the Allied II court directed the district court to enter judg-
ment for Allied. 15 7
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Questionable Utility of the Territorial Limitation to Cases Jinvolving
Intangible Property
In Allied II, the court's act of state analysis centered upon the situs
of the Costa Rican bank debts. 158 On its face, this approach appears to
150. See id. at 521-22. Under this "ordinary" situs analysis, the court bal-
anced several factors that supported siting the debt in New York and ruled that
those factors outweighed Costa Rica's interest in the contracts at issue. Id. The
"New York" factors included: Costa Rica's consent to jurisdiction in the United
States; Costa Rica's agreement to pay the loans in New York in United States
dollars; and the United States' interest in maintaining New York's status as a
financial center. Id. The court also noted that Allied Bank, the syndicate's
agent, was located in New York. Id.
151. Id. at 522.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court quoted the pertinent terms of the Costa Rican loan
agreement:
If the Borrower shall not effect any payment of principal or interest on
the promissory notes at maturity, due solely to the omission or refusal
by the Central Bank of Costa Rica to provide the necessary U.S. Dol-
lars, such an event shall not be considered to be an event of default
which would justify the demandability of the obligation, during a pe-
riod of 10 days after such maturity date.
Id. at 522 n.4.
156. Id. at 522.
157. Id. at 523.
158. See id. at 521-22.
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be proper since the act of state doctrine, under its traditional definition,
is applicable only to a sovereign's acts done "within its own terri-
tory."1 59 However, problems exist because the situs of intangible prop-
erty is a fiction. It is submitted that when a court applies a situs test to
intangible property, it is undertaking an arbitrary analysis that neglects
the policies underlying the act of state doctrine.
160
A primary reason that courts devise "situs tests" is to provide some
predictability as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine to inter-
national business transactions. This goal, however, has not been accom-
plished with respect to intangible property because courts disagree over
the applicable test and the proper analysis under each test. To illus-
trate: In Allied II and Braka, the Second Circuit ignored its earlier situs
tests and applied the Fifth Circuit's fail accompli test. 161 Additionally, in
Allied II the Second Circuit applied what it labeled an "ordinary" situs
test along with thefait accompli test. 16 2 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in
Calejo, rejected thefait accompli test altogether as a means to site intangi-
ble property where a foreign national is the debtor and a United States
159. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. For a discussion of the territorial limitation
of the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 49-97 and accompanying text.
160. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 19, § 469 reporter's note 4.
This note provides:
In principle, it might be preferable to approach the question of the ap-
plicability of the act of state doctrine to intangible assets not by search-
ing for an imaginary situs for property that has no real situs, but by
determining how the act of the foreign state in the particular circum-
stances fits within the reasons for the act of state doctrine and for the
territorial limitation.
Id. (citations omitted).
For criticisms of the application of the territorial limitation to intangible
property, see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Powers of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 805, 828 (1964) (if basis of act of state doctrine is related to
foreign affairs, courts may not be competent to render decisions regarding sov-
ereign acts that have impact outside sovereign's territory as well as within); Hoff-
man & Deming, The Role of the U.S. Courts in the Transnational Flow of Funds, 17
N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 493, 494-95 (1985) (courts involved with debtor coun-
try litigation have become "mesmerized by such vestigial . . . concepts as the
situs of an intangible debt . . . [and] . . . end up exacerbating the problems
created by the debt crisis rather than contributing to a solution"); Lowenfeld, In
Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102,
123 (1978) (mechanical situs tests do not serve values underlying act of state
doctrine); Rosenthal,Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW.
487 (1985) (proposing that territorial limitation be replaced by limiting act of
state doctrine to sovereign acts that effect sovereign's public policy within its
territory); Comment, supra note 31, at 490-91 ("[a]n approach comprehensive
enough to cover intangible as well as tangible property interests would go far to
alleviate the confusion courts have experience [sic] in applying the doctrine");
Note, supra note 74, at 906-07 (courts can manipulate situs rules to reach any
result they desire).
161. For a discussion of Allied II, see supra notes139-57 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Braka, see supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
162. Allied 11, 757 F.2d at 521-22.
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national is the creditor. 16 3 The Fifth Circuit held that the fait accompli
test was improper because any seizure of debts by a sovereign would
always satisfy the test regardless of how many "ties" the loan contract
had with the United States. 16 4
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Callo necessarily implies that appli-
cation of itsfait accompli test in Allied H and Braka was inappropriate and
that, moreover, even were the test applicable, the Allied H court reached
the wrong conclusion under the test. The Fifth Circuit in Callejo set
forth a situs test based on evaluating the "incidents" of a debt, a test
comparable to the Allied H "ordinary" situs test, as well as to the ap-
proach taken by the Second Circuit in Garcia. 165 This apparent confu-
sion among courts over the applicable situs test for intangible property
has eroded any predictability in the application of the act of state doc-
trine to intangible property. As the law currently stands, parties to in-
ternational loan transactions cannot know what test will determine the
situs of the debt.
Further, the Second Circuit has not been consistent in its analysis
under thefait accompli test. While in both Allied H and Braka, the court
applied this test, its focus was different in each case. The fait accompli
test originally revolved on whether the act of the foreign state came "to
complete fruition" within the borders of the acting sovereign. 166 In Al-
lied H, the court reasoned that the Costa Rican directives did not come
to "complete fruition" because Costa Rica did not "wholly extinguish"
the obligation of the Costa Rican banks to timely repay the foreign
debt. 167 In Braka, however, the court focused on the terms of the de-
pository contracts in determining that Mexico performed afait accompli
with respect to the effects of its exchange controls on the certificates of
deposits in the case. 168 Thisfait accompli analysis stands in direct con-
trast with the test espoused in Allied H. Moreover the Allied H court con-
cluded that Costa Rica could not "wholly extinguish" the obligation of
its banks to timely repay their debts in United States dollars; in fact,
however, the directives delayed payment of the debt. In sum, the Allied
H and Braka decisions provide no guidelines for proper application of
the fait accompli test.
In Allied H, the court also applied an "ordinary" situs test, although
the court did not reveal the source of this test. 169 It is not apparent why
163. 764 F.2d at 1122-23. For a discussion of Callejo, see supra notes 88-95
and accompanying text.
164. 764 F.2d at 1123.
165. For a discussion of the Garcia approach to siting intangible property
where an act of state question is raised, see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying
text.
166. See Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715. For a discussion of thefait accompli test
as developed in the Tabacalera case, see supra notes 57-65.
167. 757 F.2d at 521.
168. 762 F.2d at 224-25.
169. Allied H, 757 F.2d at 521-22. The Allied H court merely cited the Taba-
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the court performed this test since the court deemed it inapplicable to
its act of state analysis. 170 Under the "ordinary" situs test the Allied H
court weighed the interests of the United States versus those of Costa
Rica in siting the debt within its borders. 17 ' The court found numerous
United States interests, focusing on New York's status as a financial
center and on the terms of the loan agreement under which the Costa
Rican banks agreed to pay United States dollars in New York to the
creditor banks and consented to jurisdiction in New York.' 72 In con-
trast, the court found that Costa Rica's "interest in the contracts at issue
[was] essentially limited to the extent to which it [could] unilaterally al-
ter the payment terms."' 7
3
The court's balancing fell short in its consideration of Costa Rica's
interest in siting the debt within its borders.' 74 In Allied II, Costa Rica
imposed directives temporarily restricting payment of external debt as a
means to stabilize its economy in a time of economic crisis. 17 5 Costa
Rica's interest in the effectiveness of these directives far exceeded its
ability "to unilaterally alter the payment terms" of the foreign loan
agreements.
1 76
In Callejo, the Fifth Circuit, after rejecting thefait accompli test, ana-
lyzed the "incidents of the debt" by focusing solely on the contractual
terms of the certificates of deposit. 177 The court sited the deposits in
Mexico because they were issued and payable in Mexico. 178 The Callejo
court did not examine the interests and purposes behind the Mexican
government actions in determining whether the act of state doctrine was
applicable. 179
calera case for the proposition that siting intangible property for act of state pur-
poses is different from ordinary purposes. Id. (citing Tabacalera, 392 F.2d at 715-
16).
170. Id. at 521. The Tabacalera court did not identify a single ordinary situs
test, but rather, pointed out that intangible property can be located in different
places for different purposes, such as venue or tax purposes. 392 F.2d at 714-
15.
171. 757 F.2d at 521-22.
172. Id. at 521.
173. Id. at 522.
174. One commentator has characterized the "ordinary" situs test em-
ployed by Allied H as a weighing of "apparent irrelevancies." See Letter to the
Editor from David Lindskog, INT'L FIN. L. REV., May, 1985, at 24.
175. See Allied H, 757 F.2d at 519.
176. See Campbell, Allied Bank's Effect on International Lending: A Non-
US Perspective, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1985, at 26, 28-29. This commentator
views the court's balancing process as a "fallacy" and observes that "[t]he hold-
ing of the Court of Appeals in Allied H amounts to a negative response to the
question: may a foreign state ever expect that its acts will be given precedence
over local obligations?" Id.
177. 762 F.2d 222. For a discussion of the Callejo case, see supra notes 88-
95 and accompanying text.
178. 764 F.2d at 1124.
179. See id. The Callejo court enunciated several factors which are relevant
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Allied II, Braka, and Callejo together illustrate that the situs approach
is dysfunctional as a means to determine the applicability of the act of
state doctrine to cases involving intangible property. Rather than en-
gage in the fiction of locating intangible property, it is submitted that a
court should examine the rationales underlying the act of state doctrine
to determine its applicability. 180
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino stands as the most recent unified
Supreme Court pronouncement on the proper application of the act of
state doctrine. 18 1 In Sabbatino, the Court enunciated two broad guide-
lines that a court should consider in deciding whether to apply the act of
state doctrine. First, a court should determine whether there exists cod-
ification or consensus regarding some controlling legal principle which
it can readily apply to resolve the litigation. 18 2 Where no such codifica-
tion or consensus exists, the Sabbatino Court concluded that application
of the act of state doctrine is appropriate to protect a court from being
faced with "the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice."1 83 Second, a
court should examine the importance of the implications of an issue for
United States foreign relations; where an issue "touches sharply on na-
tional nerves" there arises strong justification for resolution of the issue
exclusively by the political branches.184 The Sabbatino Court added that,
within these guidelines, a court should contrast "the practices of the
political branch with the limitations of the judicial process."' 8 5 The Sab-
batino Court noted that the executive branch can engage in diplomacy to
under an "incidents of the debt" analysis, including the intent of the parties and
the involvement of the American banking system. Id. at 1123-24. However,
when the court applied the test, it relied solely on the fact that the certificates
were issued and payable in Mexico. Id. at 1124.
The problem with the Callejo approach is that the dispositive factors in the
court's decision to apply the act of state doctrine were the terms of the certifi-
cates of deposit. Id. The act of state doctrine, however, is rooted in separation
of powers concerns; its application embodies a determination that a court will
recognize the acts of foreign sovereign governments, inter alia, in deference to
concerns of United States foreign policy. Accordingly, the terms of a contract
between two private parties are inapposite to the issue of whether the doctrine
should apply. For a discussion of the separation of powers rationale for the act
of state doctrine, see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
The act of state doctrine is a judicial doctrine and cannot be waived by an
agreement between two parties. See RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 19,
§ 469 comment e. It is submitted that where a court determines the applicability
of the doctrine based on the terms of the contract at issue it is effectively al-
lowing two parties to waive the doctrine based on the terms of their agreement.
180. For citations to authorities advocating this approach, see supra note
160.
181. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a discussion of the Sabbatino opinion, see
supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
182. 376 U.S. at 428.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 431.
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marshal the rights of all United States citizens who are harmed, whereas
the judiciary can have only an occasional impact depending on a plain-
tiff's ability to initiate a lawsuit in the United States.' 8 6 The Sabbatino
Court observed that "[p]iecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the
probability of affront to another state could seriously interfere with ne-
gotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch and might prevent
or render less favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise
be reached."' 18 7
An analysis under the Sabbatino guidelines as applied to the facts of
Allied mandates application of the act of state doctrine. First, as evi-
denced by the lack of consistency between the various opinions in the
case, there is no codification or consensus regarding the controlling
legal principles applicable to the issues raised in the Allied case.18 8 Sec-
ond, Allied implicates the debt crisis of the developing countries, which is
most severe in Latin America, and surely qualifies as an issue with broad
implications for United States foreign policy touching "sharply on na-
tional nerves."1 8 9 The Sabbatino decision concluded that in deference to
separation of powers concerns, a court has to weigh the competence of
the judiciary versus that of the political branches in resolving act of state
questions.' 90 Against the background of the broad international impli-
cations of the Third World's debt burden, the Allied II court should have
recognized that a comprehensive resolution will not emerge from deci-
186. Id. See also First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 788 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
187. 376 U.S. at 432.
188. See Note, supra note 74, at 934-35 (noting absence of history ofjudicial
management of international debt). See also Reisner, Default by Foreign Sovereign
Debtors: An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (while most debtor
nations have had to restructure their external debt since 1981, there has been no
litigation concerning sovereign defaults).
189. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. For a discussion of the Latin American debt
and the involvement of United States banks, see supra notes 1-2 and accompany-
ing text. The gravity of the problem was recently summarized by a leading polit-
ical scientist:
It should not be downgraded or ignored. Not only is it a crushing bur-
den on the Third World, but it severely injures the U.S. economy as
well. Hundreds of thousands of jobs in export industries have been
lost because of it. It represents serious dangers to American foreign
policy and security interests. Relations with Latin American countries
have already suffered, and much worse may come if the burden cannot
be lifted. Hopeful beginnings of democracy may well be stifled, and
suffering nations may well turn to anticapitalist and anti-U.S. solutions.
It is to be hoped that bankers and financial authorities will demand only
what they can reasonably expect to receive and permit the debtor coun-
tries to resume progress toward more abundance. And the financial
system must be reformed to prevent another such breakdown in the
future.
Wesson, The Third World Debt, in 51 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 619, 622 (1985).
190. 376 U.S. at 431.
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sions by United States courts.19 1
The Allied II decision foreshadows the potentially adverse effects of
piecemeal judicial decisions. In Allied II, the Costa Rican directives re-
stricting external debt repayment were temporary. 19 2 While the decision
was pending in Allied I, the Costa Rican government, its central bank,
and other Costa Rican state financial entities, including the defendants
in Allied, signed a refinancing agreement with a United States bank that
was acting as a coordinating agent for all of Costa Rica's external credi-
tors. 19 3 Over 170 foreign creditors accepted the agreement, including
all but one member of the Allied syndicate.' 9 4 Fidelity Union Bank of
New Jersey (Fidelity Union), which had the largest piece of Allied's
loans,' 9 5 refused to enter into the restructuring, and Allied Bank pro-
ceeded to press the appeal and subsequent rehearing for the benefit of
Fidelity Union alone. 196
The Allied II case has set a precedent for "rogue creditors" such as
Fidelity Union to disrupt sensitive international debt negotiations.' 9 7
Large money-center banks cannot practically seek judicial relief for for-
eign loan defaults because their exposure is so large that their interests
191. See Lowenfeld, Foreword, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 491 (1985).
192. 757 F.2d at 519. For a discussion of the Costa Rican directives, see
supra note 122.
193. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 12-14, Allied 1I, 757 F.2d 516 (on
file at office of Villanova Law Review).
194. Id. at 13.
195. See Kallen, supra note 121, at 97. Fidelity Union invested $2.3 million
in the syndicate's $10 million loan. Id.
196. 757 F.2d at 519.
197. The problem of a rogue creditor or windfall beneficiary was addressed
by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in First Nat'l City Bank. 406 U.S. at
794 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In that case, the petitioner sought to retain excess
proceeds it realized by selling collateral in satisfaction of a loan made to a Cuban
bank prior to its nationalization by Castro's government. Id. at 778-79 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The petitioner contended that it was equitably entitled to
the excess to offset its losses incurred by Castro's expropriation of its property
in Cuba. See id. Justice Brennan observed that the petitioner was seeking a
windfall at the expense of other claimants. Id. at 794 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
He explained:
Our Government has blocked Cuban assets in this country for possible
use by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to compensate fairly
all American nationals who have been harmed by Cuban expropria-
tions. Although those assets are not now vested in the United States or
authorized to be distributed to claimants, it is reasonable to assume
that they will be if other efforts at settling claims with Cuba are unavail-
ing. In that event, if petitioner prevails here, it will, in effect, have se-
cured a preference over other claimants who were not so fortunate to
have had Cuban assets within their reach and whose only relief is
before the Claims Commission.
Id. It is suggested that the Allied II court should have foreseen the analogous
and potentially detrimental consequences of a judgment in favor of Fidelity
Union. For further discussion of First Nat 'l City Bank case, see supra notes 108-18
and accompanying text.
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have merged with the interests of the debtor countries in seeking revital-
ization of debtor country economies. 198 However, regional banks with
less aggregate exposure generally have no long term commitment to the
economic restoration of debtor nations and so will turn to the courts
when their loans fall into default. Under the Allied II approach of siting
the intangible property, courts can provide relief to these smaller banks
without consideration of the larger implications on the international
economy and on the aggregate of United States creditors.
The refusal of the Allied II court to recognize the validity of the act
of state doctrine may reflect the court's unwillingness to set a precedent
potentially undermining the sanctity of all United States loan agree-
ments with debtor nations. 19 9 The court may have perceived that a
judgment in favor of the Costa Rican bank debtors would signify ap-
proval of unilateral actions by debtor countries to restructure their pri-
vate obligations. A judgment in favor of the United States creditor, on
the other hand, could afford protection to United States creditors by
deterring such unilateral actions. Analogous concerns were addressed
by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino regarding expropriation made in vio-
lation of international law. 200 The claimants in Sabbatino urged that "the
economic pressure resulting from [not applying] the act of state doc-
trine will materially add to the protection of United States investors. '20 1
In response, the Court stated:
We are not convinced, even assuming the relevance of this con-
tention. Expropriations take place for a variety of reasons,
political and ideological as well as economic. When one con-
siders the variety of means possessed by this country to make
secure foreign investment, the persuasive or coercive effect of
judicial invalidation of acts of expropriation dwindles in com-
parison. The newly independent states are in need of continu-
ing foreign investment; the creation of a climate unfavorable to
such investment by wholesale confiscations may well work to
their long-run economic disadvantage. Foreign aid given to
many of these countries provides a powerful lever in the hands
of the political branches to ensure fair treatment of United
States nationals. Ultimately the sanctions of economic em-
bargo and the freezing of assets in this country may be em-
ployed. Any country willing to brave any or all of these
consequences is unlikely to be deterred by sporadic judicial de-
198. See Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity for Change. A Commentary on the Debt
Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 613, 617-18 (1985) (large
money-center banks are interested in assuring that debtor countries "have the
opportunity to generate needed foreign exchange").
199. See Hoffman & Deming, supra note 160, at 506-09 (arguing that expec-
tations of parties to international loan contracts should control).
200. 376 U.S. at 435-36.
201. Id. at 435.
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cisions directly affecting only property brought to our shores.
If the political branches are unwilling to exercise their ample
powers to effect compensation, this reflects a judgment of the
national interest which the judiciary would be ill-advised to un-
dermine indirectly. 20 2
This reasoning is equally compelling with respect to defaults by for-
eign debtors involved in loan transactions with United States banks.
Debtor nations must remain creditworthy to revitalize their economies.
External political and economic pressures from multilateral financing
agencies such as the IMF and from the United States government can
also be exerted to discourage debtor nations from taking unilateral ac-
tions affecting their debt. Finally, where a debtor nation takes unilateral
action, the political branches, not the judiciary, have the means and
power to negotiate a favorable and comprehensive resolution for all
United States banks.2 03 It is submitted that piecemeal adjudication, the
approach supported by the decision in Allied H, does not satisfactorily
accommodate the rights of all interested parties, nor does it necessarily
serve the foreign policy relations of the political branches.
B. Consistency With United States Law and the Bernstein Exception
In Allied I, the Second Circuit, rather than reviewing the act of state
defense, held that "[c]omity considerations demand that the actions of
Costa Rica be recognized in the courts of the United States," concluding
that the Costa Rican directives were consistent with United States law
and policy.20 4 Despite the widespread criticism of the Allied I analysis, 20 5
vestiges of this approach resurfaced in Allied 11.206 By interposing the
question of whether the foreign act is consistent with United States law
and policy before an act of state anaylsis, it is submitted that the Allied H
202. Id. at 435-36.
203. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 113-31. These commentators sug-
gest an alternative to allowing unilateral suits against defaulting foreign banks.
Id. at 113. The authors propose a response on the national level by the Execu-
tive, as was taken by President Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis with re-
spect to an Iranian threat to withdraw its vast deposits from United States banks,
rather than private suits against the foreign banks. Id.
204. Allied I, supra note 10, at 747. For a discussion of Allied I, in which the
court found that the Costa Rican directives were consistent with United States
law and policy, see supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 6, at 237-42 (criticizing novel use
of comity as alternative to act of state doctrine and characterizing such alterna-
tive as "too flimsy" for such use); Tigert, Allied Bank International: A United
States Government Perspective, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 511, 523-24 (1985)
(comity is only one factor to be considered in choice of law analysis); Zaitzeff &
Kunz, supra note 49, at 473-74 (Allied I court relied on comity to avoid question
of siting debt under act of state analysis).
206. In Allied H, the Second Circuit reversed its decision regarding comity
and the consistency of the directives with United States law and policy before it
examined the act of state defense. 757 F.2d at 519-20.
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decision added a new and unnecessary layer of analysis to suits involving
acts of a foreign state.
Prior to Allied II, the Second Circuit employed the law and policy
analysis only as a second step, and then only if the court concluded that the
act of state doctrine was inapplicable.2 0 7 In Allied II, however, the court
reviewed the law and policy analysis before considering the act of state
doctrine. Then, after concluding that the act of state doctrine was inap-
plicable, the court again considered whether the Costa Rican directives
were consistent with United States law and policy. The court failed to
explain why it went through this new procedure; therefore, it remains to
be seen whether lower courts will follow this three-part approach.
20 8
Unlike a "law and policy" analysis, the act of state doctrine involves
separation of powers issues.2 0 9 Arguably, these issues are crucial when
a case involves acts by a foreign sovereign, and it is suggested that it is
improper to decide such cases without addressing separation of powers
concerns. Moreover, there is no judicial economy in reviewing "law and
policy" before the act of state. In fact, a "law and policy" analysis may
be more confusing in its application than the act of state doctrine. In
Allied H, for example, the court was not consistent with prior case law as
it compared the Costa Rican directives to both United States domestic
and foreign affairs law. 2 10
Additionally, there is a danger that creditors may read the Allied II
decision as standing for the proposition that unilateral restructuring of
private obligations is inconsistent with United States law and policy. In
finding the Costa Rican directives inconsistent, the Allied II court relied
207. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First City Nat'l Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's
"second step" analysis, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
208. It is possible that the court was only refuting its decision in Allied I
before proceeding to its own analysis. However, the court did not definitely
indicate that this was its approach. Thus, lower courts cannot be sure of the
proper procedure for deciding act of state cases.
209. For a discussion of these separation of powers issues, see supra notes
40-45 and accompanying text.
210. See Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 49, at 461, 477. These commentators
noted this further ambiguity in the Allied cases. In prior cases involving extrater-
ritorial acts of state, the Second Circuit examined the consistency of the foreign
law with United States public policy such as the United States domestic policy
against confiscation of property. Id. at 461 (citing Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485
F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)). The Allied I court, however, relied at
least in part on the consistency of the Costa Rican directives with United States
foreign policy. Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 49, at 477. This ambiguity was per-
petuated by the Allied II court, which deemed the Costa Rican directives incon-
sistent with United States foreign policy regarding international debt
restructuring. Allied 11, 757 F.2d at 519-20. Thus, even assuming the validity of
a law and policy analysis set forth in the Allied opinions, it is not clear whether
extraterritorial acts of state must be viewed as consistent with United States pub-
lic policy or with its foreign policy.
19861 NOTE
41
Kelly: The Act of State Doctrine and Allied Bank
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
exclusively on the assertion in the Government's amicus brief that the
executive branch disfavored unilateral action by debtor countries and
instead favored multinational cooperation within the framework of IMF
procedures. 2 11 It is arguable, however, that the directives were consis-
tent with IMF procedures since the IMF later indicated approval of
Costa Rica's actions. 2 12 Neither the court nor the amicus brief ad-
dressed the IMF's approval of Costa Rica's actions. Thus, it is unclear at
this point what degree of involvement with the IMF's system of interna-
tional cooperation and negotiation is required for a sovereign's act of
restructuring its debt to be consistent with United States law and policy.
While the Second Circuit in Allied II relied on the Government's
brief for the "law and policy" question and not for the act of state doc-
trine, the criticisms of the Bernstein exception set forth by six Justices of
the Supreme Court in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 21 3
apply with equal force to Allied H. First, the issue of whether a court
should recognize the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign govern-
ment is a judicial question.2 14 Such determinations should occur under a
principled analysis of the act of state doctrine and should not be unduly
influenced by executive suggestions which vary with political cur-
rents. 215 Further, the court's adherence to the executive's suggestions
211. See Allied H, 757 F.2d at 519-20. The executive department's brief
stated:
There is thus a process in place for resolving economic adjustment
problems such as Costa Rica's. It is a process that adequately balances
the interests of creditors and debtors, public and private, generally in
the framework of an IMF-approved adjustment program, and which re-
lies for solutions on the voluntary cooperation of each. This process is
impaired, not aided, by judicial recognition of a country's unilateral
suspension of external payments on debts expressly made payable in
the United States.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Allied H, 757 F.2d 516.
212. See Quale, Allied Bank's Effect on International Lending: The New York
Angle, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1985, at 26, 27. A special lending facility of the
IMF provided additional funding for Costa Rica from 1981 through 1984 to help
the country meet its debt service. SeeJ. PIPPENGER, supra note 12, at 155-56. To
obtain this funding, Costa Rica was required to submit to the IMF a detailed
statement of its economic objectives and policies for the period of the loan, and
Costa Rica obtained IMF approval of its objectives. Id.
213. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). For a discussion of the Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine, see supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text. See also
Quale, supra note 212, at 30 (Allied H court's deference to executive branch "ap-
pears to be a throw-back to the Bernstein exception").
See Note, supra note 74, at 917 & n.83. This commentator similarly criticizes
Allied II for the court's reliance on the executive's amicus brief: "The Second
Circuit's reversal concerning the consistency of the Costa Rican decrees with
U.S. law and policy ... suggests that it uncritically accepted the government's
arguments. Such acquiescence to executive suggestion undermines the integrity
of the decision-making process and politicizes the act of state determination."
Id. at 917 n.84 (citations omitted).
214. See RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 19, § 469 comment e.
215. See First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 790-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in Allied II demonstrates the court's failure to recognize potential latent
effects of its decision that may be harmful to the conduct of United
States foreign relations with Costa Rica. 2 16 To enforce its judgment,
the United States creditor that prevailed in Allied II would be required to
bring enforcement proceedings outside the United States as the Costa
Rican bank defendants had no United States assets.2 1 7 Presuming the
creditor's success in such proceedings at some later date, enforcement
could vex then current United States relations with Costa Rica. In a
broader sense, given the political sensitivity of the developing world's
debt crisis and its profound implications for United States economic vi-
tality, a court must conscientiously avoid the risks of politicizing judicial
decisions by undue deference to executive suggestions. An executive
suggestion assures a court only that its adjudication of a foreign act of
state will not embarrass the executive.2 18 However, as Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent in First National City Bank, embarrassment to
the executive is only one policy consideration that a court should con-
sider in deciding whether to recognize the validity of a foreign act of
state.2 19 The court should also consider whether there exists a consen-
sus as to any controlling legal principles that might apply to the issue in
the case, whether the issue has important foreign relations implications,
and whether the judiciary is competent to serve the interests of all ad-
versely affected parties. As was previously explained, these considera-
tions in Allied II warrant judicial recognition of the sovereign's acts
notwithstanding a contrary executive suggestion. 220
VI. CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine provides that a court shall not sit in judg-
ment of the acts of a foreign sovereign government affecting property
within that sovereign's dominion. Where a foreign sovereign act such as
imposing currency controls affects international loan agreements or
other financial transactions, the doctrine may emerge as the critical judi-
For a discussion ofJustice Brennan's dissent, see supra notes 114-18 and accom-
panying text.
216. See First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 792-93 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). As Justice Brennan observed,
Resolution of so fundamental [an] issue (as the basic division of func-
tions between the Executive and the Judicial Branches) cannot vary
from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department. To-
day, we are told, Uudicial review of a foreign act of state] does not con-
flict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may.
Id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring)) (brackets by Justice Brennan).
217. See Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under International Bank Loan Agreements
with Foreign Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 89.
218. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
219. 376 U.S. at 785-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
220. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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cial principle in a United States court's decision to give or not give effect
to the international agreement. In Allied H, the Second Circuit had to
determine whether the act of state doctrine required the court to recog-
nize the validity of Costa Rican directives that temporarily restricted the
outflow of foreign currency, thereby compelling Costa Rican banks to
default on a loan obligation to a United States banking syndicate.
The court's act of state analysis turned on an uncertain evaluation
of the situs of the Costa Rican banks' debt. Where an act of state affects
intangible property, courts, like the Allied H court, have attempted to
determine the situs of the property since the act of state doctrine tradi-
tionally applies only to sovereign acts affecting property within a sover-
eign's borders. Courts have developed several analytically inconsistent
situs tests, none of which function to serve the policy rationales underly-
ing the act of state doctrine.
The act of state doctrine rests on the constitutional principle of sep-
aration of powers. Where a court is faced with an act of state involving
intangible property, rather than attempt the fiction of siting the intangi-
ble property, the court should examine whether the policy rationales un-
derlying the doctrine are implicated. If there exists no controlling legal
principle to apply to the case and if the case involves sensitive issues of
United States foreign affairs, a court should apply the doctrine and reso-
lution of the issues in the case should be left to the political branches.
The Allied case arose in the broader context of the Third World
debt crisis, which poses a serious threat to the economy of the United
States and the world. The Allied ! court's situs analysis does not provide
a principled approach for future courts faced with these sensitive issues.
An act of state analysis that adheres to the policies underlying the doc-
trine would provide more certainty for United States parties to interna-
tional financial transactions and would better insure equality of
treatment for all United States creditors and investors affected by the
precarious economic status of the debtor countries.
In Allied H, the court stated that, based on international comity, it
would recognize the validity of the Costa Rican directives if they were
consistent with United States law and policy. The court performed this
law and policy analysis before its act of state evaluation as a separate,
alternate legal principle under which it could give effect to the Costa
Rican directives. In so doing, the Allied H court added a novel and un-
necessary layer of analysis. Additionally, the court was unduly influ-
enced by advice from the executive that the Costa Rican directives were
inconsistent with United States law and policy. The court should have
relied directly on the act of state doctrine and made ajudicial determina-
tion of its applicability. Such an approach would not be subject to exec-
utive pronouncements that vary with political currents.
M. Erin Kelly
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